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CRISIS BUREAUCRACY: HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE
POLITICAL DESIGN OF LEGAL MANDATES
Dara Kay Cohen,* Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,** and Barry R. Weingast***
Policymakers fight over bureaucratic structure because it helps shape the legal
interpretations and regulatory decisions of agencies through which modern governments
operate. In this article, we update positive political theories of bureaucratic structure to
encompass two new issues with important implications for lawyers and political scientists:
the implications of legislative responses to a crisis, and the uncertainty surrounding major
bureaucratic reorganizations. The resulting perspective affords a better understanding of
how agencies interpret their legal mandates and deploy their administrative discretion.
We apply the theory to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Two
principal questions surrounding this creation are (1) why the president changed from
opposing the development of a new department to supporting it and (2) why his plan for such
a department was far beyond the scope of any other existing proposal. We argue that the
president changed his mind in part because he did not want to be on the losing side of a
major legislative battle. But more importantly, the president supported the massive new
department in part to further domestic policy priorities unrelated to homeland security. By
moving a large set of agencies within the department and instilling them with new homeland
security responsibilities without additional budgets, the president forced these agencies to
move resources out of their legacy mandates. Perversely, these goals appear to have been
accomplished at the expense of homeland security.
Finally, we briefly discuss more general implications of our perspective: first,
previous reorganizations (such as FDR’s creation of a Federal Security Agency and Carter’s
creation of an Energy Department) also seem to reflect presidential efforts to enhance their
control of administrative functions – including some not directly related to the stated purpose
of the reorganization; and, second, our analysis raises questions about some of the most
often-asserted justifications for judicial deference to agency legal interpretations.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern governments implement most legal mandates through bureaucracies.
Politicians delegate authority by crafting legislative compromises. Lawyers and judges
interpret their meaning. But bureaucratic agencies are often the entities that most directly
wield the power to spend money, impose penalties, provide public services, and regulate
individuals and organizations. Consequently, a central question in public law concerns
who exactly controls the bureaucracy’s power to interpret and execute law. Although
legal scholars are consumed by normative debates concerning who should exercise such
control, those debates are difficult to resolve or even follow in the abstract without some
knowledge of the techniques used in the political process to control bureaucratic power
over legal interpretations and over the execution of regulatory mandates.1
Surprisingly, the creation or reorganization of bureaucratic units – such as the
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – remains among the least-understood
such techniques.2 We know politicians may create or reorganize agencies for multiple
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For just a few thought-provoking examples of this sprawling genre, see Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:
The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, U. CHICAGO OLIN LAW & ECON. PAPER NO. 268, YALE L.J.
(2006)(forthcoming); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
1239 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
2
See, e.g., KAREN M. HULT, AGENCY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN 5 (1987)(“Despite the
popularity of reorganization, the jury deciding its impact is still out – and is sharply divided”).
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reasons: to appear as if they are addressing a salient policy,3 to please organized interests
most likely to be directly impacted by the agencies,4 to create procedures that bias agency
policy in particular directions,5 and (perhaps more occasionally) genuinely to address a
major problem of public concern in a prescriptively defensible manner.6 We know far
less, however, about how these different potential motivations interact, or how agency
structure is affected by major crises such as the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Importantly, we remain ignorant about precisely how and why politicians allocate
different chunks of legal responsibility to distinct bureaucratic units.7
These gaps are evident in the persistence of certain puzzles about the largest
government reorganization in a half-century – the creation of the DHS.8 For instance,
why did the President support the creation of DHS after initially opposing it? Why did
the agency become so vast, including in the reorganization a wide range of components
with little or no responsibility for homeland security? We also understand little about
whether the crisis enabled or forced politicians to forge a bureaucracy that actually
enhanced the government’s capacity to undertake security-related functions. Even as the
creation and operation of DHS continues to inspire controversy, policymakers and
scholars have yet to address these questions.9 Nor have they been resolved in the wideranging criticisms leveled at DHS following the Katrina disaster, or in light of the
national security threats the Department was nominally designed to address.10
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See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995); R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD,
THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990).
4
See Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (1994); Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political
Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 LAW * CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981).
5
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. “Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Fall 1987): 243-77.
6
AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (discussing how the
structure of the Joint Staff, through the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, was engineered to be more functional
than it had been before).
7
See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 (2003)(emphasizing the extent of
uncertainty regarding why presidents choose specific designs for agencies and reorganization plans); JAMES
Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 265 (1989) (discussing the difficulty in assessing the range of motivations for
specific reorganization plans given that “presidents have taken to reorganizations the way overweight
people take to fad diets…”).
8
Regarding the size and scope of the reorganization that resulted in DHS, see Donald F. Kettl, Overview in
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S FIRST YEAR: A REPORT CARD 1 (Donald F. Kettl, ed.
2004)(“[A]t its inception on March 1, 2003, the DHS brought together twenty-two federal agencies and
more than 170,000 employees – the largest restructuring since the creation of the Department of Defense in
1947”).
9
For a cogent account of the creation of DHS that nonetheless fails to address these questions, see DONALD
F. KETTL, SYSTEM UNDER STRESS: HOMELAND SECURITY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2004). Although Kettl
notes that the President shifted his position regarding the creation of DHS, he does not address why the
President proposed such a massive reorganization. Nor is his explanation of the President’s change in
position, which focuses on events such as the testimony of FBI whistleblower Colleen Rowley, entirely
convincing (the President changed positions on the creation of DHS well before Rowley’s congressional
testimony).
10
For criticisms involving the response of DHS and its bureaus to Katrina, see, e.g., DOUGLAS BRINKLEY,
THE GREAT DELUGE 227-278 (2006); for criticisms of DHS, see, e.g., Eric Lipton an d Matthew L. Wald,
Focused on 9/11, U.S. Is Seen to Lag on New Threats, N.Y. TIMES A1, August 12, 2006; Spencer Hsu,
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The colossal new DHS melded the functions of twenty-two previously-existing
agencies, from Treasury’s Customs Service, to Agriculture’s Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, to the previously independent Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Upon its creation, the department gained regulatory authority over transportation security
and matters as disparate as marine ecosystems and the migration of refugees. Its ranks
swelled with nearly a quarter of a million federal employees ranging from border
inspectors to environmental compliance officers. Nothing of this scope had happened in
the United States since the creation of the Department of Defense a half-century earlier.11
Even for reorganizations of smaller scope than that of the DHS or the Defense
Department, the structural changes are unlikely to be symbolic, devoid of legal and
policy consequences. Such an assumption ignores the aggressive infighting over structure
among legislators, the executive branch, and organized interests.12 Ignoring the
significance of changes in bureaucratic structure also neglects the findings of work in
political science and sociology,13 and the legal doctrines vesting valuable discretion in
specific administrative agencies.14 Yet we are only beginning to understand precisely
how changes in structure shape the implementation of legal mandates, and how that
significance would affect legislative bargaining over the contours of agencies such as
DHS.
We propose to address these questions by combining a detailed analysis of the
legislative process creating DHS with a new theory of the impact of bureaucratic
structure on the execution of legal mandates. Our theoretical approach extends existing
accounts of bureaucratic structure to address key features of the DHS case that also arise
in other cases of bureaucratic change – especially the role of crisis in loosening the
constraints of organizational interests and the impact of senior legislators guarding their
committee jurisdiction.15 In the process, our analysis fills several gaps in the legal and
DHS Terror Research Agency Struggling, WASH. POST A8, August 20, 2006. See also sources cited infra
Part III.e.
11
See Kettl, Overview, supra note 8.
12
See Zegart, Flawed By Design, supra note 6; PETER SZANTON, FEDERAL REORGANIZATION: WHAT HAVE
WE LEARNED? (1981); RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT’S GOVERNMENT: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION 1936-1939 (1966). In a related vein, Scholars of race,
property, education, and economic geography would naturally question the analogous assumption that
changes in geographic lines of territorial jurisdiction – where one city or county ends and another begins –
are of little consequence. For an insightful discussion of the path-dependent social impact of territorial
subdivisions, see Richard Thompson Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV.
843 (1999).
13
Regarding the impact of structure on organizational culture, see David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and
Economic Theory, in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 90, 109-10 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A.
Shepsle eds., 1990); CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1991). MORE GENERALLY, SEE: Terry
Moe, “Political Structure of Agencies," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government
Govern? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989). For a review of the political science and
political economy literature on the political implications of bureaucratic changes, see Barry R. Weingast,
Caught in the Middle, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the Political-Bureaucratic
System in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312 (Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson, eds. 2005).
14
See Jerry Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005)
15
Existing work in political science, and particularly in the field of positive political theory, provides
important insights into how political officials use various ex ante and ex post techniques to control
bureaucratic policy implementation; in particular, how they use bureaucratic structure to serve their
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political science literature concerning matters, such as how reorganizations differ from
familiar procedural techniques for controlling the bureaucracy, including environmental
impact requirements or cost benefit analyses; how reorganizations may be enacted
despite their adverse impact on the performance of widely-held goals; and how
presidents, legislators, and organized interests sometimes bargain about bureaucratic
structure in the shadow of an engaged, rather than disconnected, mass public.
As crises create windows of opportunity for legislative action, presidents gain an
opportunity to assert greater control over statutory interpretation and discretion to
administer regulatory powers by weakening the countervailing interest group and
legislative dynamics that would ordinarily work against enhancements of executive
power. In the midst of public pressures for legislative changes, policy changes in the area
of concern – in our case, homeland security – can be driven by the efforts of politicians to
affect regulatory and administrative activities in a different domain. Changes in security
policy may powerfully affect other legal and policy domains, such as the Coast Guard’s
environmental regulatory functions, or the application of immigration laws. Second,
politicians use the occasion of legislation to force changes elsewhere having little to do
with principal issue being addressed.16 While these themes are particularly relevant in
the context of national and homeland security, they also hold important implications for
the more often-studied aspects of bureaucratic politics, affecting domains such as
pharmaceutical and environmental regulation and (as painfully demonstrated by the
response to Hurricane Katrina) federal emergency disaster relief.
Against this theoretical backdrop, our account also yields answers to the DHSspecific questions about the Administration’s decision to support reorganization and to
pursue it on such a massive scale. We argue that the President changed his mind in part
about the reorganization because he did not want to be on the losing side of a major issue.
But more importantly, he supported reorganization that included a massive new
department to further domestic policy priorities independent of homeland security. By
moving a large set of agencies to the new department, and giving them new homeland
security responsibilities without the promise of additional budgets, the President forced
these agencies to draw resources away from their legacy mandates.
Though such changes have unquestionably become part of the President’s own
legacy, fixing the precise extent to which he and his top advisers consciously schemed to
weaken domestic administrative and legacy mandates without regard for a corresponding
homeland security benefit must await the judgment of history. But our analysis does
establish three crucial realities. First, the Administration eventually pressed for the
largest possible Department despite the security-related risks of the merger identified by
political goals.There is a wide-ranging literature on this topic in political science and, more recently, in
positive political theory and the law. See infra Part II.
16
Examples abound. For instance, in dealing with the savings and loan crisis, Congress allowed the
magnitude of losses from savings and loans to rise by failing to produce legislation in 1986. The conflict
stemmed from differences in what add-ons should be included to the legislation, such as housing benefits or
unrelated features of bank regulation. Similarly, the major savings and loan bailout legislation in 1989
greatly increased the costs of dealing with that crisis by prescribing other benefits as part of the legislation,
notably, housing and urban redevelopment. See Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast, Political
Foundations of the Thrift Debacle, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTIES __ (Alberto Alesina and
Geoffrey Carliner, eds. 1991).
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some of the Administration’s own aides. Second, many of the key players participating
in or affected by the Department’s creation – including legislators and bureau employees
– explicitly grasped how the merger threatened legacy mandates. Third, key features in
the legislative progression culminating in the creation of DHS – in particular, the
President’s pledge of revenue neutrality and the White House’s willingness to consider
including agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Aviation
Administration – make little sense without assuming that the White House harbored the
goal of affecting the performance of legacy mandates, even if doing so failed to yield a
corresponding security benefit. In light of these realities, one suspects it would have
proven more taxing for senior Administration officials to be willfully blind about the
merger’s effect on legacy mandates than it would have for them to count on those effects.
From a prescriptive point of view, our conclusions are sobering. Our analysis
shows how the merger adversely affected even those legal mandates plainly relevant to
homeland security.17 More generally, decisions about whether to create a new security
agency, what scope and size to give it, and how to organize congressional jurisdiction
over it are unlikely to have been driven by meaningful prescriptive concerns. Yet such
decisions are also unlikely to be merely symbolic. They can powerfully – and covertly –
reshape how laws are implemented while making it more difficult for government to
achieve broadly-shared prescriptive goals. Marginal improvements depend on solving
problems of legislative oversight, and on whether competent bureaucrats will improbably
succeed in forging autonomy and capacity in a world unlikely to support it. While these
scenarios remain elusive, our analysis does not yield a blanket condemnation of
bureaucracies created through high-profile reorganizations. Bureaucracies forged in
crisis may not be inexorably doomed to fail in carrying out their legal responsibilities,
and there may yet be reasons to defer to their legal interpretations. Instead, we highlight
the difficulties in averting such failure.
Our argument proceeds as follows. Part I presents the homeland security story
since just before September 11. Part II develops our theory of bureaucratic organization
and performance, with an emphasis on policy change in response to crises. Part III
applies the theory to the creation of DHS and related legislative enactments, providing
empirical support for the theoretical conclusions. Our purpose there is not merely to
demonstrate how the architecture of DHS was politicized, but to elucidate more
specifically in what manner political considerations shaped the agency’s structure, and to
what effect. We conclude by discussing promising avenues for further research and
noting that the prospects for improving homeland security depend crucially on
understanding the political forces that constantly pervade, and often warp, the work of
organizations entrusted with this crucial mandate.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF HOMELAND SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
17

See infra Part III.e., Conclusion. Our claim is not that DHS is entirely dysfunctional, or that it is
responsible for the full extent of the disaster following the flooding in New Orleans that resulted from
Hurricane Katrina. Instead we contend that the prescriptive case for the creation of DHS is unpersuasive,
that its creation entailed transition costs of uncertain duration and extent (a fact recognized even by many
of its proponents), and that a plausible case can be made that specific difficulties – such as those faced by
the TSA or FEMA during and after the Katrina crisis – were exacerbated by the creation of DHS.
Regarding the background degree of expert uncertainty permeating analyses of the policy implications of
particular legal and policy changes, see PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT (2005).
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Public bureaucracies decide where dams are built, whether nuclear power plants will add
to energy production, how intelligence operations are conducted, who gets turned away at
the border, and what environmental standards must be met. As with the imaginary lines
that subdivide metropolitan areas into distinct jurisdictions, enormous practical
significance flows from the legal rules allocating power among bureaucracies. Lurking
behind the design of those rules may be a complex political story.
In this Part, we begin tracing such a story, describing the interwoven origins of
DHS and the Homeland Security Act (HSA), the sprawling statute from which the new
department was forged. We discuss the political context and substance of Act at length
for two reasons. First, our story contrasts with certain canonical descriptions of
legislative developments following the September 11 terrorist attacks, which tend to
emphasize resolute presidential leadership and relative legislative passivity.18 In contrast,
our account reveals presidential policy reversals, the centrality of congressional
bargaining even in the midst of a crisis, and the resulting statutory intricacies governing
the new cabinet agency. Second, certain puzzles emerge from the story of the Act and the
Department, setting the stage for our analysis in the sections that follow.
A. The Status Quo Before September 11
The end of the Cold War dramatically affected debates about American security.
By the middle of 2001 American policymakers discussing security had replaced
references to a balance of power, containment, and mutually assured destruction,
focusing instead on terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and above all “homeland security.”19
Terrorist attackers had struck several times during the previous eight years, most notably
at the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995.20 In response, the new
president-elect created a structure within the White House National Security Council to
coordinate matters involving terrorism, its prevention, and the nation’s ability to prepare
and respond to such attacks. Unlike previous directives, the focus was primarily on
attacks targeting the United States itself.21
18

See, e.g., Julie Mason, White House Watch: Burnout on the Bush Team?, HOUSTON CHRON. A14, March
19, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 4564959 (observing that after September 11, Congress kept a “rubber
stamp” on hand for the White House); Lewis H. Lapham, Exit Strategies, HARPER’S MAG. 7 (January 1,
2006)(emphasizing the extent to which the post-September 11 era appears to involve “a cowed
legislature”).
19
The term was generally taken to refer to the security of the American homeland, its infrastructure and its
population from a full range of manmade threats See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM
INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 7 (1999)(discussing funding for “domestic preparedness and
homeland defense”), avail. at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf (last accessed June 19, 2006);
U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21 CENTURY, SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY: A
CONCERT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND PROMOTING FREEDOM 14 (2000)(describing “homeland defense”
as a preeminent security goal), avail. at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseII.pdf (last
accessed June 19, 2006). The reports of these high-level blue-ribbon panels contrast sharply with the
prevailing rhetoric describing U.S. national security challenges a mere 15 years earlier. Compare Office of
the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (1996)(failing to emphasize
terrorism
or
homeland
security
as
preeminent
security
challenges),
avail.
at
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/, last accessed June 19, 2006.
20
See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 71-102
(2004)(“Commission Report”).
21
See id.
ST
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The perceived need for coordination arose in part from the existence of numerous
bureaus with responsibilities relevant to preventing, preparing for, and responding to
manmade threats against the United States.22 For instance, homeland security
encompassed aspects of the work of the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the
National Security Council.23 Rounding out the coterie of national security bureaucracies
were agencies devoted to intelligence, criminal investigation, and prosecution. The
CIA’s explicit core function of intelligence combined with its covert operations.24 By
2001, it had multiple task forces working on terrorism-related issues, and an elaborate
group focused almost entirely on Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda.25 Specialized
intelligence entities, such as the National Security Agency, further complemented these
activities by engaging in electronic eavesdropping outside the Untied States and
gathering considerable signals intelligence. Homeland security and terrorism prevention
were also considered the province of federal special agents and the law enforcement
agencies for which they worked. As hearings in three Senate committees during the
week of May 7, 2001 demonstrated, law enforcement agencies were routinely considered
to be responsible for protecting the American public.26 The FBI commanded vast
budgets and statutory responsibility, serving as the lead counter-terrorism law
enforcement agency.27 Foreign attacks on American interests, such as the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, invariably led to the deployment of an FBI team.
Several bureaus with regulatory, enforcement, and administrative responsibilities
also performed missions relevant to homeland security. A host of specialized law
enforcement agencies existed, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The INS served multiple inspection,
detention, investigation, quasi-adjudication, and policy functions related to controlling
the flow of people into the country. Customs had the similarly daunting task of
preventing prohibited items, from drugs to explosives, from entering.28 Within the U.S.
22

See generally id.; U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL (2000)(describing separate law enforcement, national
security, and disaster relief missions for different government agencies). The identification of “homeland
security” primarily with terrorism and similar manmade threats is derived from the Bush Administration’s
own budget analyses.
See, e.g., Budget of the United States 23 (2003), avail. at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy03/pdf/bud05.pdf (“To develop the homeland security budget, the
Office of Homeland Security… identified those activities that are focused on combating and protecting
against terrorism and occur within the United States and its territories.”)(emphasis added). By using this
definition, we do not mean to imply that it is a reasonable one. Indeed, as indicated by our discussion
below on Hurricane Katrina in Part III.e and our analysis of the prescriptive merits of the Department’s
creation, there are considerable grounds for questioning the exclusion of major natural disasters from the
definition of homeland security.
23
See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 93-102.
24
See id. at 88-91.
25
See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 167-171 (2004).
26
The Senate Armed Services, Appropriations, and Intelligence committees held hearings analyzing the
work of the approximately forty different agencies responsible for combating domestic terrorism. See, e.g.,
Testimony of Paul H. O’Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Commerce, State, and the Judiciary, 2001 WL 47932 (F.D.C.H., May 8, 2001).
27
See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 74 (“For countering terrorism, the dominant agency under
Justice is the Federal Bureau of Investigation”). Id. at 82 (“[T]he FBI and the justice Department… took
on the lead role in addressing terrorism because they were asked to do so”).
28
Customs was also responsible for trade-related revenue collection and the implementation of hundreds of
legal mandates related to trade regulation. See Customs Service: Comments on Strategic Plan and
Resource Allocation Process, Testimony of Norman Rabkin, Director, Admin. of Justice Issues, General
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Treasury Department, Customs had the largest budget, staff, and responsibility. Like
INS, it performed more than just investigative functions (e.g., tracking down money
launderers, drug traffickers, and illicit brokers of technology subject to export controls).
It also played a regulatory function. While INS regulated the entry of people, Customs
controlled the vast flow of goods into (and, in theory, out of) the United States. The
Secret Service investigated counterfeiting and fraud-related financial crimes in addition
to serving its most visible role of protecting the President. In addition to collecting excise
taxes, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had become a law enforcement
agency focused on firearms and explosives, with a wealth of technical expertise on these
subjects unrivalled elsewhere in the federal government.29
Transportation and coastal security were handled largely through a tangle of
overlapping functions nominally overseen from within the federal Transportation
Department. The FAA looked after security of the aviation infrastructure, imposing
(among other things) mandates on airlines and airports requiring them to pay for
employees to screen passengers and their luggage. The Coast Guard similarly shared
with Customs responsibility for key aspects of port security. It also performed coastal
search and rescue operations along with a multitude of safety, rate-setting, and
environmental regulatory functions.30
Presumably, the work of these agencies could forestall a disaster that would have
had to be handled by emergency response bureaucracies, who together formed the final
pillar of homeland security – emergency response.31 Of these, FEMA was the most
important. In addition to fielding emergency response teams and serving as a conduit for
disaster relief money, FEMA also encompassed insurance programs to help mitigate the
longer-term impact of various natural disasters.32
Three features of the status quo characterized this mix of national security, law
enforcement, regulatory, and disaster relief capability that would later be catalogued
under the homeland security label. First, policymakers assumed homeland security
bureaucracies to be capable of operating reasonably effectively even though they had
largely separate reporting structures and bureaucratic identities. Though some legislators
and independent commissions complained about the fragmentation of responsibility for
security-related problems, legislators tolerated the decentralization of bureaucratic power
over national and homeland security.33 Second, the description of agencies above
demonstrates that virtually every bureaucratic unit that had a role to play in homeland
security also had separate functions – such as INS’ role in providing immigration services
Government
Division,
GAO
T-GGD
98-15
(Oct.
16,
1997),
avail.
at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98015t.pdf.
29
See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 82 (“The ATF’s laboratories and analysis were critical…”).
30
See U.S. Government Manual 308-335 (2000).
31
See id.
32
See Wamsley, Gary L. and Aaron D. Schroeder, Escalating in a Quagmire: The Changing Dynamics of
the Emergency Management Policy Subsystem, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 235 (1996). These efforts
complement those of state and local responders who are likely to nearly always be the first on the scene and
to make up the bulk of the people responding to a terrorist attack. See Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader,
Organizing the Federal System for Homeland Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas, 62 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 44, 46 (2002).
33
See House Speaker Forms Terrorism Panel, AERO. DAILY & DEF. REP’T 254, 2001 WLNR 2059324
(February 15, 2001).
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– that were different in scope and therefore potentially in conflict with security. Finally,
enormous variation existed in the degree of coordination across relevant units. Some
problems were undeniable, such the relationship between the FBI and the CIA (and, for
that matter, between the FBI and just about everyone else). But there were also apparent
successes, as when federal officials foiled a plot to bomb traffic tunnels leading into New
York City and some of its major landmarks.
C. Shocks and Responses: The Immediate Aftermath.
The administration’s initial response to the September 11 attack focused on
proposing substantive legal changes. Working groups at the Justice Department soon
pulled together legislative proposals from preceding years to fashion an outline of what
would become the USA Patriot Act.34 The President also used his executive powers that
could be deployed without legislative approval. The White House supported federal
agents’ aggressive use of immigration and material witness authority to detain scores of
people almost immediately following the attacks, and the President used his authority
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to block the assets of
various individuals and organizations suspected of being tied to terrorists.35
The White House staff also oversaw the implementation of two noteworthy
changes in organizational structure, though its approach to each of demonstrated a great
deal of caution about major changes in the allocation of bureaucratic jurisdiction. On
October 8, using existing statutory authority, the President created the position of
homeland security advisor within the Executive Office of the President, and appointed
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to fill it. Ridge sought to build a structure around his
position to match the President’s ambitious rhetoric that the new Office of Homeland
Security would “coordinate” policy by staffing a Homeland Security Council paralleling
the structure of the National Security Council.36
An implicit presumption that underlay the creation of Ridge’s office concerned
the value of coordinating separate agencies mixing homeland security missions with
other functions. A gap was presumed to exist not only in the provision of advice, but in
the extent of coordination among a great many agencies and bureaus.37 White House
officials believed that success in the arena of homeland security depended on enhancing
such coordination.38 Ridge sought to provide that coordination, or at least the trappings
34
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of it. But even delivering the image of greater coordination to the public proved
daunting. The National Counterterrorism Coordinator structure set up at the NSC now
had a mandate overlapping that of the new Homeland Security Office. There were no
precedents for how to resolve the potential jurisdictional conflicts, nor was it obvious
precisely what it meant for Ridge to coordinate, what his role would be in a crisis, or
whether the conflict between the NSC and the HSO would prove a major impediment to
the goal of coordination.39
Sensing disarray, some legislators insisted that the new Homeland Security
Advisor should be subject to Senate confirmation and have statutory powers over
budgets. Senator Bob Graham, a Democrat from Florida, introduced S1449 to transform
Ridge’s entity into a new National Office for Combating Terrorism to achieve the
aforementioned purposes. Other legislators went even further, reiterating occasional calls
made earlier by selected legislators and blue-ribbon commissions for the creation of a
new cabinet department focused on domestic security.40
The President opposed these efforts. Instead, White House aides emphasized the
advantages of the status quo: no department, and a staff office to coordinate homeland
security. From October 2001 until at least March of 2002, the President’s Press Secretary
insisted that creating a cabinet department was unnecessary, and possibly
counterproductive.41 Unfortunately for the White House, the performance of the new
Office during the anthrax attacks questioned the President’s argument that coordination
had been sufficiently bolstered by the creation of Ridge’s Office. During the anthrax
episode, some observers described Ridge’s response as tentative and uncertain.42 Despite
the new Homeland Security Advisor’s declaration that he was in charge of the response,
Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson appeared to contradict Ridge.
During this period, despite the absence of formal budget authority, Ridge pressed for, and
helped the White House achieve, a $1.2 billion increase in the immigration enforcement
budget.43
A second structural change took shape in discussions between Congress and a
reluctant White House regarding the creation of a new federal bureaucracy to consolidate
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responsibility for transportation security.44 With its creation in 2002, the Transportation
Security Agency (TSA) assumed complicated responsibilities over the security of the
nation’s transportation infrastructure.45 The White House initially opposed the idea. The
President preferred to forego creating a new bureaucracy and to keep the screeners
private. Whether that opposition was rooted in ideology or in concern for the organized
interests likely to be affected, the Administration later abandoned its reluctance and
endorsed the idea. Some observers with access to the deliberation now report that the
Administration’s acquiescence reflected not only mounting pressure from congressional
Democrats but also the recognition that the mass public was unlikely to trust private
screeners given their inability to prevent the hijackings.46 The new law placed TSA
within the Transportation Department. The new agency’s creation was also accompanied
by an initial dismemberment of the FAA’s security capacity (bitterly opposed by FAA),
lodging it elsewhere at Transportation.
D. Initial White House Resistance to Reorganization
Well before September 11, a number of legislators and blue-ribbon commissions
had called for consolidating some agencies with a homeland security mandate in a
cabinet-level agency.47 Various plans on Capitol Hill focused on three functions: border
security and enforcement, disaster response functions relevant to terrorist attacks, and
policymaking activities to facilitate the prevention of attacks.48
Following the attacks, Senator Joseph Lieberman, then serving as Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee Chair, re-introduced legislation to centralize certain
government functions into a single homeland security department. While some
Republican legislators, such as Arlen Specter, expressed some interest, the President did
not. He believed that such consolidation would constitute a waste of time at best. On
March 19, 2002, for instance, in response to a questioner who asked about “[w]hy… the
White House continue[s] to resist the idea of making the Office of Homeland Security a
Cabinet-level department,” Press Secretary Ari Fleischer insisted that:
I’m not aware of a single proposal on Capitol Hill that would take every single one
of those agencies [dealing with terrorism] out from their current missions and put
them under Homeland Security. So even if you took half of them out and put them
under a Cabinet level Office of Homeland Security, the White House would still
need, in the President’s estimation, an advisor on how to coordinate all the myriad
of activities the federal government is involved in. So creating a Cabinet office
doesn’t solve the problem. You still will have agencies within the federal
government that have to be coordinated.49
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Several factors might have made the creation of a new department seem
problematic from the President’s perspective. The substantive benefits of a consolidation
were not obvious, indeed, highly uncertain – a point to which we return below. Major
changes were likely to provoke opposition from powerful legislators whose committees
stood to lose some jurisdiction and from the interest groups they served.50 Moreover,
career officials and political appointees within the administration were likely to resist the
transfer. Opposition among the bureaucracy could have proven politically costly to the
President,51 increasing the risk that reorganization would backfire and potentially
exposing the Administration to criticism in the press or on Capitol Hill.52 Critics of
previous reorganizations had, after all, pointed out that they had created such problems in
the past.53 Finally, to the extent that prescriptive concerns mattered at all (something we
explore and question below), they might cut sharply against the sort of reorganization
that might seem superficially appealing to the public. Reorganizations almost inevitably
cost money and create friction among people and organizations scrambling to understand
the consequences of the new hierarchy under which they must work. Moreover,
reorganizations create new authority structures that typically engender friction which
hinders one of the main reasons for reorganization, namely, coordination.
Even in the midst of its crisis mode, White House aides may have appreciated
certain risks inherent in taking responsibility for a massive reorganization. In the short
run, there was a substantial chance that reorganization would actually decrease agencies’
effectiveness in responding to security threats, at a time when the Administration almost
certainly persist or grow. Though little is known about the impact of reorganizations on
bureaucratic performance, it is widely acknowledged that performance suffers at the
outset.54 One account of the frantic days following September 11 underscores the extent
to which these prescriptive concerns, intermingled with an appreciation of the political
costs, were on the White House radar screen even two days after the terrorist attack:
By Thursday, Abbot, Kuntz, and Libby [aides to Vice President Cheney] had
concluded that the first thing the Bush administration should do would be not to
reorganize all those agencies, but to hire a heavy weight to come work in the White
50
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House and coordinate them, much the way Condoleezza Rice, the National
Security Advisor, coordinated the various agencies involved in foreign and defense
policy. They could never get all the agencies with some role in domestic security
into one department, they reasoned, because so many also did so many other,
unrelated jobs. (FEMA, for example, administrates [sic] flood insurance in
addition to coordinating the federal response to disasters.) The goal should be to
coordinate whatever they did related to homeland security, rather than spend a lot
of time and money dislodging them from their current departments.55
The White House emphatically followed that path, insisting that Ridge’s office fit the
bill, coordinating both the sprawling federal security apparatus and the thousands of local
police and fire departments, from Manhattan to Minnesota to Manhattan Beach, still
scrambling to enhance security in their local jurisdictions.56
Despite the Democrats’ control of the Senate, Congress was broadly supportive of
the President in the two months following the attack. The Administration achieved rapid
passage of the Patriot Act and a resolution authorizing the use of force abroad in response
to the attacks. Even individual Democratic legislators seemed initially inclined to
cooperation. Senator Graham, for example, agreed to his proposed legislation. The extent
of congressional support contributed to an impression of considerable (if not frantic)
policy change and implementation. The Administration’s burst of activity since
September 11 – including the Patriot Act, the creation of a large new transportation
security bureaucracy, the private sector’s thrust to crack a new homeland security market,
state and local officials’ regional exercises, the invasion of a central Asian nation, and
forging a new White House staff office – seemed to push the limits of what the nation’s
political machinery could digest in such a short time.
E. Shaping a Reorganization and Striking Legislative Bargains
But legislators were not entirely passive participants in the policymaking process.
Emboldened by White House reluctance and public opinion surveys, a score of legislators
called for a new cabinet department focused on homeland security.57 White House aides
thus encountered a more complex political terrain. By late October 2001, Lieberman in
the Senate and Republican Mac Thornberry in the House led what had begun as an
unlikely (if not downright outlandish) crusade to forge agencies into a new superbureaucracy that began to pick up support among both Republican and Democratic
legislators.58 The response from the White House through the rest of 2001 and early 2002
remained an emphatic “no.”
This negative response was not, however, the last word from the White House. On
55
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June 7, President Bush unveiled his own proposal for a new Department of Homeland
Security.59 Hints that something was in the works had appeared since April, when
Budget Director Mitch Daniels publicly stated that the President could propose reforms at
a later date.60 What Daniels did not say was that the President had already set the process
in motion. In late 2001 and early 2002, the President had several conversations with
Ridge and Chief of Staff Andrew Card about the merits of creating a new department to
administer homeland security.61 Responding to congressional resistance to an earlier
border consolidation plan, the president apparently noted the plan “seems kind of small to
me,” and then added:
You know, maybe we should stop getting pecked to death like this. Maybe its time
to think big. When you do something piecemeal, all the interests here come at you
one by one and kill you. Let’s just make believe we are re-created the government
from scratch and map out what we’d put in a new homeland department and then
maybe we’ll go for it [emphasis added].62
By March, aides to Ridge, Card, and Daniels were holding secret meetings.63
Participants in the meetings now suggest that their deliberations were driven largely by
prescriptive concerns about the organizational merits of consolidating various units. The
group was also driven by concerns about what could be sold on Capitol Hill, as
underscored by the fact that the initial small group was soon expanded to include staff
from the White House legislative affairs operation.
Although the limitations of sources describing these early meetings make it
impossible determine the participants’ precise mix of concerns, the discussions soon
yielded a rough picture of a department with two significant features. First, it would be
significantly larger in scope and size than anything that had been proposed by the
Democrats or previous independent commissions. “The PEOC group,” noted one
commentator, “had now created a mega-agency that far exceeded Senator Lieberman’s
relatively modest proposal for a Department of Homeland Security, and they weren’t
finished.”64 The working group demonstrated a willingness to contemplate an even
larger department by their inclination to consider moving the FBI, the FAA, and ATF
into the Department (moves that were ultimately rejected). Precisely why the White
House process contemplated and produced such a sprawling department is not
immediately clear, a matter to which we return in Parts II and III. Second, the PEOC
group intended the new department to serve as a showcase for the value of flexibility in
presidential control of personnel. The goal of watering down civil service protections
appealed to the President’s aides, particularly Daniels.65
The 35-page legislative proposal that emerged from the meetings of the “PEOC
group” sought to establish four primary “directorates” – border and transportation
security, information analysis and critical infrastructure protection, science and
59
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technology, and preparedness and emergency response – at the core of the new
department. It included provisions allowing the President to appoint over a half-dozen
assistant secretaries without Senate confirmation, and sought to imbue the President with
power to redistribute appropriations among several different agencies. It called on
political appointees to rewrite civil service protections governing many of the agency’s
new employees and to replace them with a “flexible” system, presumably vesting greater
power over career officials in the hands of political officials.66
The plan’s starkest feature sought to move some 22 agencies into DHS, despite the
fact that not all their functions conform to even the most expansive definition of
homeland security. The marine environmental portions of the Coast Guard, for instance,
were to be entirely absorbed by the new department, as were the revenue collection and
trade enforcement functions of the Customs Service, and the agricultural regulatory
functions of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.67
In contrast, many previous proposals for the creation of a homeland security
agency had contemplated more modest changes.
For example, Republican
Representative Mac Thornberry’s pre-September 11 bill, introduced in March of that
year, essentially contemplated moving FEMA, Customs, the Coast Guard and border
patrol to the new agency.68 Unlike the President’s plan, agencies like the Secret Service,
APHIS, the investigative and regulatory functions of immigration authorities, health
related functions such as the national vaccine stockpile, and Treasury’s Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center were left untouched.69 The reorganization’s mixing a wide
range of legacy missions with new homeland security responsibilities raised the question
of how the tradeoffs were to be made across these missions.70
A flurry of activity followed the White House’s June 7 announcement. The White
House briefed Cabinet members (many of whom were just learning about the plan at that
point) and legislative leaders. The President’s aides spoke to the media. And at 8pm
Eastern Time, the President spoke to the nation about the plan.71 The elaborate roll-out
confirmed that the President and his staff were now not only joining the chorus of support
for the reorganization but sought to lead the reorganization drive. The building blocks of
the new proposal broke from past plans in the larger scope of agencies to be included and
in the provisions weakening civil service rules. Despite these differences, publicly the
plan was premised on the same logic that the alternatives were: the value of
centralization.
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Behind the scenes, several factors may have helped dissipate the Administration’s
previous resistance.
Its legislative affairs staff documented rising support for
consolidation among legislators.72 Security issues almost certainly continued holding
much of the public’s attention, particularly given the congressional testimony of FBI
“whistleblower” Colleen Rowley, who had unsuccessfully sought to get authority to
search the computer of alleged terrorist Zacarias Moussaui, and continued public debate
about whether an independent commission would ultimately be created to investigate the
September 11 attacks.73 The White House opposed that Commission too. It might have
seemed politically risky to the President and his aides to oppose the new department and
an independent commission heading into the midterm congressional elections. In
addition, creating a new department may have had particularly strong political salience
because of its appeal to latent, if potentially superficial, notions of effective governance.74
But these developments fail to account for the choices the White House made regarding
the size, scope, and prescriptive merits of the new agency.
The President’s June announcement found Congress still mired in divisions about
the merits of creating a new department. Support remained vigorous among members of
the Senate Government Affairs committee, whose members had proposed renaming the
committee “Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs” almost certainly stood to gain
prestige, power, and influence to gain if their expectation were fulfilled and the new
department was put under their jurisdiction. At the same time, a stubborn core of
opposition persisted among lawmakers who had committee jurisdiction to lose, or who
saw position-taking opportunities in opposing substantive civil service changes,
earmarks, and liability protections in the President’s proposal.75
With both the President and a growing number of legislators supporting the broad
goal of the department’s creation, there followed a period of intense bargaining. In the
House, Speaker Hastert and the Republican leadership created a two-track process to
evaluate the bill, christened the “Homeland Security Act.” Over a dozen committees
with existing jurisdiction over various aspects of homeland security would mark up the
bill, but their votes would be considered advisory in nature. Meanwhile, Hastert would
empanel a Select Committee on Homeland Security, including most of the chairs of
72
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existing committees with jurisdiction over homeland security, to make final decisions on
the House version.76
Hastert’s move is understandable. If the leadership had left the decisionmaking
solely to the existing standing committees with existing authority, they were likely to
oppose the major reorganization that the President was now publicly committed to
support and a growing chunk of the public appeared to support. Alternatively, if Hastert
created his own handpicked committee, existing members and committees would likely
be opposed to the result.
The markups revealed widespread concern among the committees regarding
potential changes in their jurisdiction. For example, the House Judiciary Committee
voted to transfer the Secret Service to the Justice Department (over which it had
jurisdiction) instead of letting it go to the new cabinet agency. The House committee
with jurisdiction over transportation issues sought (like the one in the Senate) to prevent
or delay moving the new Transportation Security Agency to the new department. And
many committees sought to limit the presidential powers in the new bill, such as those
allowing the White House to appoint assistant secretaries without Senate confirmation.
Although the first stage of advisory markups appears symbolic since the Select
Committee would have final say, the procedure resulting in these votes could also be
understood serving a critical information collecting device for party leaders who favored
the reorganization. The House leadership appeared inclined to support the President’s
push for reorganization. Nonetheless, the membership was likely to be quite wary of a
wholesale redistribution of power within the legislature, which was an almost inevitable
consequence of the reorganization legislation. The markups thus allowed the committees
to reveal what portions of the proposed changes were politically most costly to them and
which were less so. The Select Committee could then take these committee actions into
account in its decisions, either by incorporating the committees’ changes or by searching
for other means to assuage the committees’ ostensible concerns. The Select Committee
reported its version of the HSA on July 19, 2002, on a straight 5-4 party-line vote. This
legislation became the basis for the final bill, described below, and passed the full house
on July 26, 2002.77
Partisan divisions on the House Select committee foreshadowed greater conflict in
the Senate, where Democrats controlled the chamber by a tiny margin. Already, the
President’s June announcement had probably begun to blunt the perception, which
Senator Lieberman had intensely sought to foster, that creating the new super-agency was
a Democratic initiative. Lieberman now sought to recapture the initiative. In late July,
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee approved a Lieberman-sponsored version of
the homeland security bill (S2452) with civil service provisions more acceptable to the
Democrats and provisions transforming Ridge’s existing office at the White House into
an Office of Counterterrorism with a director subject to Senate Confirmation. The Senate
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then received the House version of the HSA (HR5005), which allowed the President,
among other things, the power to exempt parts of government from federal labor
management relations statutes.78 Lieberman and his allies sought to substitute his new
bill for the House version. But Senator Phil Gramm filibustered cloture motions to limit
debate.79 In the end, Senate Democrats were unable to pass a cloture motion to force a
vote on their preferred version of the bill, which would have triggered a House-Senate
conference on the creation of the new department. And they were unwilling to
compromise on the civil service provisions. Thus, when the midterm elections arrived,
the Senate had not agreed to support the President’s and the House Republican
leadership’s version of the HSA. Ironically, the Democrats were exposed to the charge
that they opposed the creation of a Department that they had played such a key role in
forcing the President to accept.80
The elections brought further unwelcome news for the Democrats, who lost the
Senate and were dealt an even more lopsided minority in the House. After a final attempt
to strip provisions allowing the President to suspend collective bargaining protections, the
Democrats compromised and allowed cloture to be invoked in the Senate by a vote of 83
to 16 on November 19, 2002. The Senate then passed the House bill with minor
amendments that were approved in the House by voice vote, and the bill was sent to the
President on November 22, 2002.81
E. The Final Bill
When the President declared victory three days later, he signed a bill that was far
more detailed than what the White House had proposed. The details reflected protracted
presidential bargaining with Congress. On the surface, the final bill established a
department that was quite similar to what President Bush had proposed. Consistent with
the President’s proposal, the core functions of the department were grouped into four
directorates: Border and Transportation Security (including the bulk of the agency’s
employees and resources), Intelligence and Infrastructure Protection (incorporating some
of the smaller infrastructure protection offices absorbed from Commerce and the FBI),
Science and Technology (including the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency, or HSARPA, initially projected to administer a $500 million fund supporting
innovative research and development projects), and Preparedness (primarily FEMA)
(Senate Govt. Affairs Committee, 2002).82 As Table 1 indicates, not every agency that
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the White House working group considered placing within the Department ended up in
the new agency. The sprawling agency had nonetheless come to encompass functions
ranging from international child labor investigations to marine fuel leaks, and included
nearly every entity that the President ultimately proposed to move into the new agency.
Table 1: Selected Agencies Considered for Transfer to DHS83
Bureau considered for transfer (in
bold if not slated for transfer
before White House deliberations
began)
Animal Plant and Health
Inspection Service (Agriculture)

Responsibilities for “homeland
security”
(using
Administration’s
definition
focused on terrorism and other
explicit manmade threats))
(Capable
of
providing
personnel for the support of
inspections at the border)

U.S. Secret Service (Treasury)

Protect top U.S. government
officials, provide security at
high-profile public events

U.S. Coast Guard (Transportation)

Patrol U.S. territorial waters,
potential incident response
capacity in emergencies, can be
deployed as part of the Navy in
wartime/emergencies;
Drug interdiction (borderline
non-homeland security)

Immigration and Naturalization
Service (separated into: Bureau of
Citizenship
and
Immigration
Services, an investigative bureau
merged with portions of Customs,
and a border enforcement and
administration bureau merged with
portions of Customs)(Justice)
FEMA (independent)

Screen entrants at the border
(including potential terrorists);
enforce internal immigration
laws (borderline non-homeland
security)

U.S. Customs Service (separated
into: Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, encompassing
portions of INS focused on border

Inspections
(screening
WMD)
Narcotics

Disaster relief and recovery
services in response to terrorist
attacks

at the border
for explosives,
interdiction

Non-homeland
responsibilities

security

Transferred?

Regulate the movement of
animals and plants into and out
of the country (affecting
individuals, small businesses,
and large agribusiness interests)
Investigate financial fraud
(“wire” and “access device”
fraud),
counterfeiting
(borderline homeland security)
Marine safety enforcement
(regulating
ships
and
companies owning ships)
Setting rates for the use of
marine
facilities
and
waterways;
Setting rules for the use of
drawbridge
and
similar
facilities;
Marine
environmental
regulatory enforcement (oil and
chemical spills, marine water
pollution rules);
Search and rescue (borderline
homeland security)
Provide immigration services to
the public (borderline homeland
security)

YES
(partial;
portions left at
Agriculture after
legislative
changes)
YES

Disaster relief and recovery
services in response to natural
disasters and major industrial
accidents; Flood insurance;
Nutrition assistance; natural
disaster mitigation
Tariff and trade-related tax
enforcement;
Write and enforce elaborate
trade regulations, including

YES

YES

YES

YES

Infrastructure, HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, TERRORISM, AND GOVERNMENT
th
INFORMATION, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 107 Cong, 2002, (Statement of Ivo Daalder).
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Sources: Brill, supra note 21 (describing the White House PEOC group’s deliberations); President’s
Proposed Homeland Security Act (describing the agencies the President sought to move into the new
department); HR 5005 (listing agencies actually included in the new agency); U.S. Government Manual
(2002)(describing agency functions).
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enforcement and administration;
and
enforcement
bureau
encompassing both Customs and
INS
criminal
investigation
functions)(Treasury)
Critical
Infrastructure
Assurance Office (Commerce)

National Infrastructure Protection
Center (Justice/FBI)
Office of Domestic Preparedness
(Justice)
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (Treasury)

(borderline
security)

non-homeland

Promote
private
sector
activities to protect critical
infrastructure from terrorist
attacks
Investigate,
analyze,
and
respond to manmade threats to
critical infrastructure
Domestic preparedness grants
(borderline
non-homeland
security)
Explosives
enforcement
(regulation
and
criminal
investigation

those involving child or forced
labor,
environmental
provisions, and strategic trade
rules
Encourage
private
activity to protect
infrastructure from
disasters
Minimal

sector
critical
natural

Disaster response functions
(including for non-terrorism
related disasters)
Collection of excise taxes on
alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and
explosives
Extensive firearms regulation
(including access, sales, and
licensing)(borderline homeland
security)
Regulating air traffic and
aviation safety

Federal Aviation Administration
(Transportation)

Aviation security

State Department Visa Processing
Functions

Screen
visa
applications
(including those requested by
potential terrorists)

Screen
visa
applications
(including those requested by
everyone else)

Transportation Security Agency
(Transportation)

Manage
national
airport
screening system
Non-aviation
security
responsibilities
Reducing the vulnerability of
nuclear powerplants to terrorist
attacks, safeguarding of nuclear
materials used for civilian
applications in the United
States

Security
responsibilities
involving threats other than
terrorism

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regulation of nearly all aspects
of the civilian nuclear industry,
including licensing of new
nuclear reactors and civilian
nuclear technologies, health and
safety regulation of the ongoing
use of nuclear technologies

YES

YES

YES

NO (moved to
Justice
Department; not
included
in
President’s
reorganization
plan)
NO
(left
at
Transportation;
left
out
of
President’s plan)
NO (included in
President’s plan,
but left at State
after
congressional
changes)
YES

NO

Despite the White House’s relative success, the legislative bargaining process also
introduced some important changes. The final Homeland Security Act contained nearly
two hundred separate legislative provisions (with some individual provisions stretching
over a half-dozen pages). In contrast, the President’s original proposal contained fewer
than fifty sparsely-written provisions focusing primarily on the structure of the four
aforementioned directorates. This disparity reflects complexities lurking beneath the
surface of the HSA.
Unlike the original White House bill, for instance, the resulting HSA
simultaneously included language explicitly emphasizing the importance of nonhomeland security missions along with the terrorism-focused language (Section 101) and
provisions establishing the Secretary’s power over the bureaus (Section 102). It could
not have been lost on legislators that the first three of the Department’s six functions
concerned terrorism. At the same time, lawmakers supplemented the blanket entreaty for
the new Department to “ensure that the functions of the agencies and sub-divisions within
the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished
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or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress” with more specific agency
specific language. In the case of the Coast Guard, legislators actually allowed some
(ostensibly limited) diminution of non-homeland security functions, but sought to
monitor changes in its non-security regulatory and safety missions by requiring regular
reports from the Inspector General and the Secretary (Section 888). The HSA also
contained similarly-detailed provisions governing a plethora of other agencies transferred
to the new department, specifying (for example) that some revenue-collection regulatory
functions of Customs would remain at Treasury (Section 412) while the Secretary of
Homeland Security could administer others,84 and providing that FEMA should carry out
an “all hazards” mission while simultaneously allowing the Secretary the flexibility to
refocus FEMA’s actual operations (Section 507).
The resulting bill also denied to the White House many of the sweeping
presidential powers contained in the original proposal. Despite the presence of united
Republican government, the bill did not allow the White House to directly control the
timing of agency transfers, to redistribute appropriations among different agencies, and to
appoint assistant secretaries without Senate confirmation. The HSA also created a host of
research institutes and centers of excellence with mandates to focus on exceedingly broad
conceptions of homeland security (including, for example, one center focused on
developing new prison-related technologies)(Sections 231-237; 312-313). Over time
these institutions would almost certainly serve as conduits for federal spending benefiting
particular regions or industries.85
Finally, the legislation accomplished a proliferation of other goals, many of which
were initially addressed in separate legislative proposals. For instance, although the
Justice Department lost virtually all its immigration enforcement power when INS was
transferred into the new Department, it gained most of Treasury’s Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (Title XI). Pilots gained a right to be armed (Title XIV). Airlines
obtained new insurance and financial protections (Title XII), and the Department gained
84

This provision is illustrative of the legislative compromises simultaneously including language
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new regulatory powers to protect manufacturers of “anti-terrorism” technologies from
liability (Sections 861-865).86
Together these features evince the importance of four recurring themes associated
with the legislative bargaining process. First, although the new bill granted the Secretary
of Homeland Security sweeping powers of “direction, authority, and control” over the
new Department (Section 102), legislators recoiled from granting the President the
sweeping powers he had requested to reallocate appropriations, appoint assistant
secretaries without confirmation, and control the timing of agency transfers. Second,
legislators showed predictable interest in creating conduits for the transfer of federal
money to particular regions or industries – in short, pork barrel. Third, lawmakers used
the fast-moving HSA to advance discrete legislative projects that allowed them to signal
desirable positions to the public (as with the provision arming pilots) or achieve major
substantive policy goals sought by organized interests (such as the expansion in airline
liability protections). Fourth, even as they ultimately voted for legislation that transferred
major agencies into a new bureaucracy, legislators insisted on asserting control over
those agencies by including provisions governing how those agencies were supposed to
discharge their missions. In particular, legislators showed some awareness that the new
department would – true to its name – emphasize homeland security over a plethora of
legacy missions. In response, lawmakers made modest efforts to stress the continued
importance of the agencies’ myriad non-homeland security responsibilities.87
Equally noteworthy is what the bill omitted – congressional organization. Section
1503 described the “sense of Congress that each House… should review its committee
structure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by
the establishment of the Department,” but the bill required no changes in structure. Thus,
as tens of thousands of inspectors, agents, and government employees began a long
journey towards their positions in the new agency in late November 2002, the
congressional oversight structure over the department’s components remained largely
unchanged.88
Earlier the White House had sought to bolster its reorganization plan by arguing
that too many congressional committees were involved in overseeing homeland
security.89 It now acquiesced to a status quo-driven congressional oversight structure.
Although the Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee appears
to have gained some degree of jurisdiction at the expensive of other committees, the
Senate’s Appropriations, Judiciary, Armed Services, and Finance Committees (among
others) all retain substantial homeland security oversight responsibilities. In the House
86
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even less centralization occurred in the legislative oversight structure. The relative
preservation of the status quo in the House probably indicated the leadership’s reaction to
the repeated standing committee “advisory” markups seeking to limit the size and scope
of the new department. Although such votes had not succeeded in limiting the scope of
the sprawling new department, little had changed with respect to congressional oversight
as late as mid-2004:
In reality, jurisdiction [over DHS] in both chambers remains allocated to dozens
of committees and subcommittees. From January to June 2004, DHS officials
testified before 126 hearings, or about 1 ½ per day of legislative session, not
including briefings or other meetings. Secretary Ridge estimated that he has been
called to appear before 80 different committees and subcommittees on the Hill.90
Potential problems with congressional oversight did little to dampen the political
enthusiasm for the new Department when it finally opened its doors in mid-2003. The
President had switched from opposing the merger to fashioning – with legislative allies –
a new homeland security agency larger than anything previously proposed. Neither the
Administration nor members of Congress involved in forging the department expressed
much uncertainty about well this sprawling arrangement would function. But history
would soon extinguish any certainty about the legislation’s merits.
Part II. UPDATING POLITICAL THEORIES OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION AND
PERFORMANCE: THE POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM
To understand the creation of DHS, we must begin by considering what politicians want
to accomplish when they bargain over the creation of a new bureaucracy. Over the past
three decades, political scientists have developed a new approach to studying questions of
bureaucratic performance and organization.91 This perspective emphasizes a series of
non-obvious implications about bureaucratic structure, incentives, and performance. In
contrast to the traditional literature on bureaucracy,92 which primarily seeks to explain
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bureaucratic inefficiency from what could be called an “internalist” perspective focusing
largely on the goals and routines of the bureaucracy itself, the new approach discussed
here places greater emphasis on explaining inefficiency from an “externalist” perspective
– one based on factors in a bureaucracy’s political environment, especially the various
legislation it faces.93
This Part uses the preceding insights about the importance of external political
dynamics to develop a theory explaining the creation and performance of bureaucracies
such as DHS. Our approach refines existing theories by better accounting for the impacts
of crises and uncertainty about the prescriptive effects of reorganization. These
refinements allow us to better understand the political design of legal mandates in other
contexts arising throughout history.
The basic outline of our theory can be summarized briefly. First, interest groups
have influence on the process because they affect the reelection prospects of political
officials.94 Interest group activity implies a bias toward those groups who are active. But
this influence is not simply general influence. It works through the political system.
Interest groups in the President’s support constituency have more influence than those
who are not. Similarly, those interests closely connected with important members on the
relevant congressional subcommittees that oversee various agencies have more influence.
Second, a range of inter-branch dynamics shape the legislative process. As lawmakers
bargain, key legislators negotiate with organized interest groups and with the president.
The resulting congressional process – combining internal negotiations among legislators,
pressure from outside interest groups, and bargaining with the president – puts its
distinctive stamp on both bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic incentives. Third, a
range of intra-branch politics affects design, involving both bureaucratic politics within
the executive branch as well as congressional bargaining among committees and among
legislators with different vested interests in the existing structure. Fourth, mass politics
affects design. Differences in how attentive and informed is the public affect the induced
preferences of representatives over various institutional design questions. Fifth, a crisis
dramatically transforms public attentiveness and can therefore dramatically change the
political pressures on a give issue. Together these factors interact in potentially complex
ways.
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A. A Theory of Legislation: Inconsistent Objectives
The civics textbook view of national legislation is that it is designed to solve
various social, economic, and security problems.95 In practice, legislation rarely
addresses these problems particularly well when measured against the standard of what
politicians publicly claim their goals to be. The reason is politics. First, as designed by
the founders, the separation of powers system assures that the two houses of Congress
and the president have different electoral constituencies and therefore respond to different
interests. The different constituencies lead officials in the different branches to favor
different ways to address each policy issue. Second, legislation requires majority support,
granting majority (and sometimes filibuster or veto-override) pivots bargaining power.
Third, each house of Congress has a range of institutions whose effect are to grant further
bargaining leverage and veto gates over legislation, notably, committees and the majority
party leadership.
All these institutional features of national politics combine to grant bargaining
power to a range of legislators with divergent goals. Routinely, these legislators use their
leverage to alter the legislation in ways that benefit their constituents who may have very
narrow interests or interests that conflict with the overall goals of the legislation. Below
we will survey a series of implications that congressional institutions have for the shape
of legislation. For now, we mention one that we believe is the most important, namely,
the effects of political compromise on the shape of legislation.
Typically, legislation begins with proponents who favor legislation that addresses
a particular problem.96 Often, the initial legislation is designed efficiently in the sense
that, given the sponsors’ definition of the problem, the legislative proposal addresses the
problem directly. This proposal is often relatively short. More importantly, the proposal
typically has little chance of passing in this form. In opposition to the legislation’s
sponsors are the opponents who see to preserve the status quo by defeating the legislation
in any form.
Although most popular accounts depict legislative struggles between the
legislation’s proponents and opponents, a critical – indeed, pivotal – third group exists;
namely, the moderates. As the moderate go – for or against – so goes the legislation. To
succeed, a bill’s sponsors must bargain with the moderates for their support. The inherent
need to negotiate to pass legislation implies that nearly all successful congressional
legislation is the product of legislative compromise between the bill’s sponsors and the
moderates. Moderates generally seek to pass a weaker form of the legislation, a bill that
simply does less of what the sponsors originally proposed. Typically, compromise the
brings the moderates on board requires limits on the legislation, including restrictions,
exceptions, and cumbersome procedures that afford interested parties the ability to
95
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contest or delay the implementation of the legislation’s effects. These provisions often
compromise the legislation’s purpose in the sense that they make it harder.97
An example: In the mid-1970s, environmentalists sought to control sulfur-dioxide
emissions, a major source of which was sulfur in coal burned to generate electricity. To
reduce these emissions, utilities could either switch to low-sulfur coal or add “scrubbers”
to their waste stacks that would eliminate the sulfur from the exhaust emissions.
Although the prescriptively optimal way to address the problem would have been to
allow some utilities to burn low sulphur coal instead of installing scrubbers, this approach
engendered political opposition because it endangered union jobs in the high sulfur coal
regions. In the end, supporters of the legislation agreed to compromise with the
representatives of the unionized coal regions to require that every utility in the country –
regardless of whether they burned high or low sulfur coal – add scrubbers. This
requirement at once raised the cost of removing sulfur from emissions, lowered the
overall environmental cleanup per dollar spent, but saved union jobs.98
In short, major legislation often approaches incoherence, in the sense that it
contains provisions designed to address a particular problem along with provisions that
limit the efficacy of those solutions in the form of exceptions, exemptions, limitations,
and cumbersome procedures.99 The latter provisions meant to qualify the act are a
necessary feature of the legislation: without them, the legislation would not pass. Put
differently, members of Congress knowingly pass an incoherent measure, in the sense
that its provisions are internally inconsistent to the point of profound ambiguity, when
they would not be able to pass the more coherent version.
B. The Political-Bureaucratic System: Institutional Solutions to Delegation Problems.
i. The Imprint of Legislative and Executive Politics on the Delegation of Statutory
Authority to Bureaucracies
The divisions among legislators – and between specific legislators and executive
branch officials – discussed above have predictable implications for the production of
statutes and the structure of the bureaucracies that implement statutes. In particular,
previous research identifies the following factors as especially likely to shape legislative
bargaining when lawmakers are divided about their goals. The general consequence of
this system is goal distortion, or the process by which politics inevitably distort the goals
of the legislation as legislators transform a proposal into a vehicle that will pass
Congress.
(1) The distributive tendency and goal distortion. An inevitable effect of the
legislative process is that benefits from a program must be widespread or the program
will not gain sufficient support to pass. Consider legislation designed to alleviate poverty.
If the proposal does this efficiently, it will concentrate resources in states and
congressional districts with high concentrations of poor people. Because poor people are
97
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a relatively small minority of the country – perhaps fifteen percent – the legislation
concentrates resources in a small number of congressional districts. This concentration
also means that the legislation will have difficulty passing. A small minority of districts
gain by the legislation, while most legislation gain little while bearing the tax costs of the
program.
In reaction to the problem of passage, bill sponsors have a tendency to distribute
the funds more widely than efficiency dictates. This distributive tendency implies a high
likelihood of goal distortion.100 By distributing the funds from a program more widely,
this tendency breaks the link between the legislative solution and the problem the
program is designed to address. Programs regularly distribute funds widely in a way that
distorts their purpose. Some examples include the space program, various urban and
housing programs, the Department of Energy’s National Laboratory system, and (as
discussed below) DHS’ programs to fund emergency preparedness grants as well as
research and development.101
(2) Multiple veto points. We have already seen that the need to command a
majority typically implies legislative compromise that affects both the legislation’s goals
and the means by which it addresses those goals. Other aspects work in the same way.
First, at least two committees (one in the House, and one in the Senate) share
jurisdiction on any given issue, and often many more committees have somewhat
overlapping jurisdiction. Because of these multiple veto points, members can sometimes
hold up legislation desired by others as bargaining leverage over legislative issues wholly
independent of the legislation. During the consideration of the early legislation
addressing the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, both house and senate passed
versions of legislation aimed at mitigating the growing problem that would ultimately
cost taxpayers several hundred billion dollars. Both versions of the bill contained similar
provisions addressing the crisis. But a compromise failed because House committee
members had added different add-ons to the legislation than had the Senate committee
members. Because the two committees could not agree on how to compromise these
additional parts, the legislation died in 1986, allowing the problem to mushroom.102
Second, another type of intra-chamber conflict concerns the distribution of power
and authority within the chamber. Committee members typically seek to enhance the
discretion, scope, and authority of their committees, even at the expense of others.103 For
example, when a new issue arises that does not readily fit with the existing pattern of
authority, members on different committees jockey for control of this issue. Energy
provides the canonical example. Prior to the energy crisis of 1973, energy was a
relatively minor issue. With the energy crisis, it suddenly became a national issue. Within
each chamber, a wide range of committees sought to control a piece of this issue. Indeed,
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negotiations over how to divide this authority within each chamber delayed a national
response to the crisis for several years, from 1973 until 1977.
The upshot is simple. As new policy issues emerge and as political support for
existing issues changes, committees negotiate over who has authority on a given issue or
a given aspect of an issue. Because the policy preferences on the different committee
jockeying for power can often be quite different, different allocations of authority within
the chamber have significant policy implications.
(3) Congressional jurisdictions. Congressional committees and subcommittees
are intimately involved in bureaucratic oversight.104 These bodies are not only each
chamber’s agents charged with overseeing a bureaucracy’s implementation of policy, but
they put their own stamp of interest on the direction of that policy.
To an important degree, the structure of Congress parallels the structure of the
bureaucracy, and vice versa. They work together. Moreover, complex policies, such as
the environment and energy, are often divided into a great many pieces, with different
subcommittees overseeing different portions of a bureaucracy’s activities.105
Because members on the different subcommittees have different interests, they
pull policymaking within their domain in different directions. For policies that are
completely independent, this is fine, but when the policies interact – as they must, for
example, because of budgetary tradeoffs – the inconsistent views on different
subcommittees can create potential problems.
These interactions plainly have implications for bureaucratic reorganization.
Consider a set of bureaus that work on related policies but were created by different
legislation and are overseen by different subcommittees or committees. They are likely to
pursue different types of goals, in part because the legislative creating them differs and in
part because the interests of the members of the relevant subcommittees differ.
Suppose that the president seeks to achieve efficiency gains by coordinating the
bureaus activities though a bureaucratic reorganization that combines the two. The degree
to which these efficiency gains are realized in practice depends in part on whether there is
a parallel congressional reorganization. Allowing the two separate subcommittees to
retain jurisdiction over the different pieces of the now reorganized bureau impedes
coordination: the different interests on the two subcommittees lead them to continue to
pull the two portions of the reorganized bureau in different directions. Members of each
subcommittee face a common pool problem: both prefer the efficiency gains, yet both
prefer more benefits from their own portion of the whole. Because they control only their
portion, each has a tendency to take more for itself. To the extent that coordination
achieves an increase in benefits that comes at the extent of one of these pieces, members
of the relevant subcommittee will use their oversight powers to work against
104

Indeed, some observers have called the relationship among congressional subcommittees, agencies, and
interest groups “cozy little triangles” and “iron triangles.” See Fiorina, supra note 92, at __.
105
See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: “Quis Custodiet
Ipsos Custodes” (Who Shall Watch the Watchers)? 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 204 (1991). For an
account of the interrelationship between bureaucratic actors, interest groups, and their overseers relying on
the colorful “iron triangle” metaphor, see Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker, Interest
Groups, iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions, 14 BRIT. J. POLI. SCI. 161 (1984).

30
coordination. In contrast, if the congressional jurisdictions are also reorganized so that
one subcommittee now gains sole jurisdiction over the bureau, it will better able make a
coherent tradeoffs between the two activities and hence to realize the efficiency gains.
(4) Partisan electoral goals. A fourth principle relevant for bureaucratic structure
is that the two national parties have incentives to use legislation to enhance their
members’ electoral goals at the expense of the other. Parties with majorities in Congress
typically have the advantage.
A particular instance of partisan warfare is “baiting” the opposition on popular
legislation. Suppose the public is strongly supportive of some legislation. Because voters
rarely follow or understand legislative details, the majority party has an incentive to add
extreme components to popular legislation in an effort to bait the minority. They do so in
hope that members of the opposition will object to or obstruct the legislation because of
these features. Often, the public fails to understand the nuances and instead sees the
opposition as simply objecting to the legislation. This gives an electoral issue to majority
party candidates who challenge opposition incumbents. Sure, the incumbent will try and
explain – “I would have supported the legislation, but this one feature made it
objectionable.” Sometimes that works, but sometimes it simply sounds like an excuse,
one that fails to convince voters.
ii. Two Theoretical Refinements.
Despite its usefulness in understanding the broad outlines of how statutes and
bureaucracies are designed by the legislature, existing work largely leaves out some
crucial elements; notably, the role of crises and uncertainty. Consider each in turn.
(1) The Role of Crises. For our purposes a crisis is (a) an exogenous shock
sharply raising demand for policy changes in a particular domain that (b) is costly for
politicians to ignore.
A political crisis has four interrelated effects on the forces underlying
bureaucratic creation and structure. First, it implies a far more attentive public.
Although the public cannot attend to the policy details, an attentive public pressures
political officials to address the problem underlying the crisis.106 Second, as a
consequence of public attentiveness, interest groups often have less power to protect their
interests. Whereas interest groups may predominate in the relevant policies areas prior to
a crisis – in part because of relatively inattentive public or because the portion of the
public that is attentive is a small subset of the larger population – a crisis that brings
public attention provides a new set of rewards for public officials to counterbalance the
rewards generated by interest groups. In some cases this change allows new interest
groups to become relevant, as in contractors following a widely publicized natural
disaster.107 Third, a crisis typically means a far greater urgency than in most policy areas
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so that political officials must act fast; failing to do so will leave political officials
electorally vulnerable for having failed to address such a critical issue in a timely fashion.
Finally, these effects are sometimes most pronounced for the president in the sense that
he is seen as the national leader.108
Taken together, these four effects have several implications for a crisis response.
First, this response is sometimes (and perhaps often) ill-considered. Because an attentive
public demands timely action but cannot understand details or the implications of all
bureaucratic-institutional choices, elected officials are tempted to act too quickly so that
they can demonstrate their responsiveness, even if their legislation is ill-considered.
As an example, consider the response to the thalidomide episode about drug
safety. Thalidomide was a drug given to pregnant women in the 1950s and early 60s to
reduce the effects of morning sickness, but had disastrous side effects induced by
impairing fetal development. Many so-called thalidomide babies were born without arms
or legs.109
Prior to the thalidomide episode, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) was highly
critical of the drug regulatory process by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
which had regulatory control over the introduction and oversight of drugs. For several
years, he had held hearings and pushed legislation that would force drug manufacturers to
prove their drugs were efficacious, namely, that they actually produced the effects that
the manufacturers claimed. Of course, the problem of efficacy is largely independent of
the problem of drug safety, which involves side effects.110 In the wake of the thalidomide
episode, the Congress quickly passed Kefauver’s proposals even the episode involved
drug safety while the legislation largely addressed the problem of efficacy.
This case exhibits two separate ironies. First, the 1962 Drug Amendments have
been shown to have massive negative effects on the introduction of new drugs in the
United States relative to Europe, Canada, and Japan. Second, under the existing
regulatory scheme thalidomide had never been introduced in the United States (the side
effects occurred from its distribution in Europe and Canada).111
Thus, the policy imperative created by a crisis combines with a public inattentive
to policy details to push political officials to act quickly, sometimes more quickly than is
advisable. For many officials, it is better to have some policy – any policy – than delay
that eventually yields a policy better aimed at the problem.
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Second, another effect of crises concerns interest groups. In contrast to the pattern
governing legislation and policymaking in ordinary times, crises can make it attractive
for politicians to act despite the opposition of interest groups. The policy equilibrium in
ordinary times generally reflects the influence of (sometimes competing) interest groups.
Crises that draw public attention provide a new source of political rewards to political
officials. Public attention thus allows legislators and the president more room to bargain
over policy changes given the extent of public demand.
Nonetheless, it is wrong to assume that this window for policy innovation is more
likely to lead to prescriptively attractive policies. With interest groups less able to stop or
water down a legislative change, the president and the legislature take center stage.
Presidents may seek new legislative authority to layer political appointees over existing
independent agencies, while enterprising legislators lacking the most desirable committee
assignments may scheme to enhance their own committees’ jurisdiction. But, as will
emerge below, their competing objectives are likely to lead them to create bureaucracies
ill-equipped to achieve stated purposes, except under special conditions. In contrast,
politicians might work hard to build an effective bureaucracy after a crisis if the relevant
goals are widely supported, if accurate information is widely available about the
relationship between structural or legal changes and the advancement of those goals, and
if bureaucratic performance to achieve those goals is easily observable over time. If
these conditions existed, a crisis could free politicians from some of the interest group
pressures that often contribute to bureaucratic failure. In contrast, in the absence of the
aforementioned conditions, crises have the potential to introduce distinctive pathologies
into the legislative process as legislators and the president scramble to produce changes
simultaneously advancing their political agendas and pleasing a more attentive public.
(2) The Role of Uncertainty. The relationship between bureaucratic institutions
and performance is not an exact science. This implies a significant degree of uncertainty
about policy effects associated with any reorganization. More extensive reorganizations
entail an even greater degree of uncertainty about long-term prescriptive consequences.
Consider a reorganization designed to create greater coordination among related
agencies. Putting the agencies together under a single umbrella with greater centralization
holds the potential for greater coordination. But it also has a range of potentially negative
effects. First, by creating a far larger and more complex organization, massive
centralization makes it harder for organizational leaders to master their organization, to
understand its separate parts and to understand the complex ways in which better
coordination can be achieved. Even if a new agency were sharply focused on a narrow
definition of homeland security, the full scope of activities involving matters such as
immigration enforcement would require officials to understand sprawling intricacies.112
Second, centralization can diminish the competition among agencies and risks creating a
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bureaucracy with a monopoly of control over a massive portion of the government’s
operation.113 Many areas of government feature competition because of the presence of
multiple, semi-independent bureaucratic units, including the three branches of the
military, the various agencies dealing with agriculture, and the many agencies focused on
urban problems. The absence of competition tends to imply less efficient performance.
Third, reorganization creates considerable uncertainty for individual bureaucrats by
changing career patterns and promotion possibilities. Bureaucrats who lose power,
authority, and promotion possibilities are far less likely to work toward the new goals
sought by the reorganization. Rivalries within a single organization can often be
counterproductive when one group seeks to promote itself over another. Fourth, some
scholars suggest that increasing the presence of levels of hierarchy slows down
bureaucratic responses to legislative signals designed to control the agency’s work
through the budget process. Politicians trying to insulate policy from legislative control
can therefore use layers of hierarchy to frustrate lawmakers’ control of agency actions.114
Fifth, on a pragmatic level, reorganization and centralization may well decrease
efficiency in the short run, as the transactions costs of combining computer systems and
designing compatible operating procedures across formerly separate agencies takes
considerable time and effort and in the short run may considerably impair performance.
Taken together, these factors suggest that centralization is likely to have two
separate effects heightening the difficulty of achieving prescriptive benefits from
reorganization. On the positive side, it holds the promise for greater coordination of
effort, potentially allowing the efforts of many previously separate agencies to add up to
a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. On the negative side, centralization
creates two different categories of problems. Uncertainty about its effects is a basic fact
of organizational politics; and greater ability to coordinate in a centralized organization at
the same time creates monopolization that reduces incentives for bureaucracies to
efficiently carry out their supposed purposes. These two opposing effects imply that the
prescriptive question of how to structure bureaucracies to accomplish particular goals is a
complex one, made all the more so because the full constellation of relevant interests
rarely agree completely on what those goals should be. Reorganization could be
complicated from a policy perspective, and they could have counter-intuitive effects.115
This is not to say that uncertainty associated with reorganization creates a
complete veil of ignorance about the consequences of forging a massive new Department.
While key audiences trying to assess the long-term security payoffs of creating the
Department would have faced considerable uncertainty, we do not believe that the
probability of gains and losses is necessarily symmetrical. Moreover, the evidence
implies that reorganizations as complex and massive as the one from which DHS was
113
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forged would be beset by transition costs.116 Finally, presidents and their staff members
may be able to predict certain implications of reorganization, such as those impacting the
performance of domestic regulatory mandates.117 By pressing agencies to do more with
similar or more constrained resource endowments, reorganizations can subtly force
agencies to reshape their activities. The relevance of uncertainty is in how difficult it
made the process of precisely fixing the full extent of the costs and benefits associated
with creating the Department. Were those costs and benefits easier to observe, the
political game affecting presidential and statutory choices would play out differently.118
D. Theoretical Conclusion: Policies Are Not Designed to Succeed
In combination, these principles imply that legislative allocations of bureaucratic
authority over legal mandates are often, perhaps even typically, not designed to succeed
at achieving their stated goals. The need to pass legislation through a complex legislative
process with many potential veto gates implies that a wide range of interests can hold up
the legislation. Their price for allowing the legislation to move forward is that the
legislation’s proponents alter the legislation in a way that advantages those holding veto
power. In combination, these imply a wide range of factors that distort the goals of the
legislation. Legislation rarely addresses policy problems directly. Indeed, sometimes they
are designed to fail. Moe’s conclusions about the design of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) during the early 1970s are instructive, and likely
generalize to a host of agencies and legal mandates:
While [the creation of OSHA] had the appearance of a systematic attack on the
problem, in fact it was an administrative nightmare that did a thorough job of
protecting business’s interests. Authority was divided among an independent
board, the secretary of labor, the states, HEW [the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare], and the courts. This would create confusion, lack of
coordination, and multiple veto points. No one was in charge, and the secretary
of labor, in particular, was kept weak. 119
As with the case of OSHA, the political dynamics discussed here show how the
writing of legislation designed to pass creates pressures that often break the link between
the goals of legislation and what the legislation actually does. The distributive tendency
reflects congressional legislation tendency to benefit a wide variety of districts rather than
concentrate resources where the problem lies. Multiple veto points allow a wide variety
116
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of legislators to hold legislation hostage in an effort to gain favorable adjustments.
Indeed, the general need for legislative compromise means that almost all legislation is
incoherent: the different legislative components often work at cross purposes whereby
one section promotes a particular goal and another qualifies and limits the ability of an
agency to attain that goal. All this can be exacerbated by a mismatch between
congressional committee jurisdiction and the organization of a bureaucracy. Put simply,
the greater the dispersal of jurisdiction, the less coherent will be bureaucratic
policymaking. Finally, partisan electoral goals often affect legislation.
By placing the focus beyond position-taking and emphasizing the role of crises
and the intricacies that impact the real-world effects of reorganization, our theoretical
approach builds on existing theories of how legislators allocate bureaucratic jurisdiction
over legal mandates. We posit not only that reorganizations are driven by politics, but
that they can be used to further presidential control and policy objectives in specific ways
– such as by reshaping the regulatory missions of bureaus, or redistributing authority
from career officials and bureau heads to political appointees. Our challenge is not just to
the questionable assumption that reorganizations tend to achieve prescriptive objectives,
but the theories that primarily emphasize position-taking or the role of politics generally
without considering what policy or distributive goals are actually being achieved and
through what structural techniques they are being achieved. As the next Part chronicles,
each of these tendencies shaped the political bargains that resulted in the creation of
DHS.

III. APPLYING THE THEORY: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Our theory of the political-bureaucratic system provides a lens through which to interpret
the legislative developments that forged the architecture of DHS. In this Part, we use the
theory to better understand the statutory and institutional features that have become
characteristic of DHS. In the process, we revisit our two principal questions concerning
the Department’s formation: why did the President change his mind to propose
reorganization qua mega-centralization? Why did the President create a DHS that
contains so many bureaucratic units, many of which are only tangentially related to
homeland security? The answers to these questions turn out to be intimately related.
A. The Political Influence of Congress
Congressional influence permeated nearly every corner of the HSA legislation
and the bureaucratic machinery it spawned. The Administration bill was short – 50 brief
provisions in comparison with the congressional legislation including 200 ones – many of
them in the convoluted legislative argot characteristically associated with lawmakers’
desire to control the bureaucracy.120 The difference between the President’s proposal and
the final congressional legislation reflects more than just filling in details and gaps; it
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reflects the effects of the congressional politics engineering the new bureaucracy to serve
the interests of its member; that is, to conform with the political-bureaucratic system.
Each of the principles discussed in the theoretical section applies to this case:
goal distortion and the distributive tendency, multiple veto points forcing alterations in
the legislation, intra-congressional committee jurisdictional issues, electoral goals of the
majority party against the minority party, uncertainty about the reorganization, and the
role of the crisis. As the theory predicts, these principles add up to a set of policies that
are not obviously designed to succeed at the stated objective of homeland security.
Consider, for example, the impact of goal distortion as it plays out through the
distributive tendency. Calculating the optimal allocation of funds is a complex task (as
Powell suggests). This calculation must take into account a wide range of characteristics,
including: (i) estimations of risk, themselves subject to uncertainty, such as the
differential risks associated with targets in high profile cities, in places like New York
and Washington; (ii) factors that reduce risk everywhere, such as increased boarder
security; and (iii) the notion that making one target far more secure makes the next most
vulnerable target more attractive to strategic terrorists.121
Despite the difficulty with creating an optimal spending plan, nearly everyone
agrees that the allocation of funds should be based on the factors noted above, especially
assessments of differential risk. Yet, as noted in the theory, spending money according to
the optimal factors often implies high concentration of funds in particular districts,
making these programs less popular in Congress. The congressional tendency is therefore
to alter the criteria for spending in a way that spreads the money around, even at the
expense of efficient pursuit of the legislation’s goals. This seems exactly what has
happened.
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff statements on January 4, 2006 provide evidence
for this view. In response to sharp criticism, Chertoff made the astounding public
announcement that thenceforth, the Department would base part of its homeland security
grant allocation on risk factors (DHS could not allocate all the funds based on objective
factors because the legislation required minimum percentage spending in every state).
Chertoff announced new rules about the distribution of such funds, based on the risk of
terrorist attack to 35 urban areas deemed to be especially vulnerable to attack. Chertoff
also stated that homeland security grants are “not party favors to be distributed as widely
as possible,” thereby suggesting that the previous approach to distributing grants
amounted to such “party favors.”122 This admission acknowledged that the Department
had not based its assessments on risk factors prior to this time.123
Indeed, a wide range of reports imply that some DHS spending may have
degenerated into another source of congressional pork, especially though spending
money in rural states with relatively low risks of terrorist attack.124 While the port of New
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York and New Jersey is widely regarded as the highest risk, it received only $6.6 million
in FY 2005, about equal to Memphis and far behind Houston’s $35.3 million.125 The
recent attempts to renew the Patriot Act in late 2005 witnessed attempts in the House to
place greater emphasis on risk factors and to lower the guaranteed minimum percentage
going to each state from the prevailing .75 to .25 percent. The Senate, with its greater
rural bias, beat back this plan so that the original law would prevail. This topic may well
be revisited as the Congress reconsiders the Act’s renewal early this year.126 Similarly, an
analysis of per capita homeland security grant spending for FY 2003 and FY 2004
indicates that in both years Wyoming—the best-funded state—received $35.30 and
$37.74 per capita, respectively. New York State, on the other hand, received only $5.10
and $5.41 per capita in each respective fiscal year. The small state-bias seems rooted in
legislators’ distributive interests, filtered through institutions enhancing the political
power of small states, rather than in meticulous analyses of why such funding should be
allocated to Wyoming or similar states.127
As the theory suggests, legislators’ distribution of federal funds reflects a common
pool problem: while all are better off from a homeland security program that fulfills its
objectives, each is better off if his or her district gains a bigger share of the total. When
all members seek greater funds for their districts, however, the consequences can be
enormous. Members of Congress have greatly hindered DHS’s ability to address the
pressing problems of terrorism in America by prescribing constraints on spending that
have little or nothing to do with homeland security and all to do with their reelection
prospects.
Another policy realm where legislators’ reelection concerns seem to be paramount
to security concerns is the creation of the so-called “Homeland Security Centers of
Excellence.” The department created six such “HS-Centers,” located at the following
universities: Johns Hopkins; the University of Southern California; Texas A&M;
Minnesota; Maryland; and Michigan State. Each HS-Center has received a grant of
between $10 million and $18 million over a three- or five-year period to study topics
ranging from network analysis to the economic consequences of terrorist attacks.128 We
hypothesized that these centers would be created in the districts of legislators poised to
lose committee jurisdiction as part of the transfer. Table 2 suggests this may have been
the case: instead of creating a mechanism for choosing center locations on the basis of
defensible analytic criteria, the statute essentially dictated the location of new centers –
placing them in areas where at least one member of the congressional delegation stood to
lose a measure of committee power. Although such a loss of jurisdiction is almost never
welcome among legislators, funding for the new homeland security centers may have
served as part of the political exchange to increase support for the new legislation among
members facing the prospect of diminished jurisdiction.
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Table 2: Congressional Representation in HS-Center States and Districts129
HS-Center
Johns Hopkins
(Baltimore, 21202)

USC
(LA, 90089)

Texas A&M
(College
77843)

District

Representatives

MD (7)

Rep.
(D)

CA (33)

Station,

Minnesota

Cummings

Govt Reform (9 of 19 D);
Transportation (18 of 34 D)

Yes

Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (D)

Appropriations; Health

Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes (D)

Banking; Budget; Foreign
Relations
Appropriations (23 of 29 D)

Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard
(D)

Yes
No
No

Commerce;
Environment;
Foreign Relations

No

Sen. Diane Feinstein (D)

Appropriations,
Energy;
Intelligence; Judiciary; Rules

Yes

Rep. Charles Stenholm (D)

Agriculture (RMM)

Yes

Sen. Phil Gramm (R)

Banking (RMM); Budget

No

Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson
(R)

Appropriations;
Rules

No

Rep. Martin Olav Sabo (D)

Appropriations (4 of 29 D)

No

Sen. Paul Wellstone (D)

Foreign Relations; Health;
Indian
Affairs;
Small
Business; Veterans’ Affairs

Yes

Sen. Mark Dayton (D)

Agriculture; Armed Services;
Rules

Yes

MD (5)

Rep. Steny Hoyer (D)

Appropriations (5 of 29 D);
House Administration (RMM)

No

MI (8)

Rep. Mike Rogers (R)

Financial Services (36 of 37
R); Transportation (28 of 42
R)

Yes

Sen. Carl Levin (D)

Armed Services (Chair); Govt
Affairs; Intelligence; Small
Business

No

Sen. Deborah Stabenow (D)

Aging; Agriculture; Banking;
Budget

TX (17)

MN (5)

(College Park, 20742)
Michigan State

Losing Jurisdiction?

Sen. Barbara Boxer (D)

(Minneapolis, 55455)

Maryland

Elijah

Committees

(East Lansing, 48823)

Commerce;

Yes

A third example of political bias in the distribution of funds concerns the new
structures for the transfers of funds. After 2001, Congress slightly reduced funding for
natural disaster grants and dramatically increased funding for counterterrorism grants.130
One example of an explosion in grant funding can be seen with grant opportunities
provided through what was once the Department of Justice’s tiny Office of Domestic
Preparedness. The office was transferred to DHS. Its grant-making abilities have grown
exponentially since the transfer. In FY 1998, the Office of Domestic Preparedness
awarded $12 million through a single grant program. As Table 3 indicates, by FY 2003,
the office was in charge of meting out funds in seven separate programs, each ranging in
129
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total funding from $19 million to $1.5 billion.131 Far from reluctant participants in this
growth, legislative majorities voted to fund the grants well beyond what the President
requested – adding over $800 million to the president’s request in this category for the
FY 2004 budget.132
Table 3: Domestic Preparedness Grant Programs, 1998-2003133
Fiscal Year

Name and Description of Program

Total Funding Provided in Award Cycle

1998

State and Local Domestic Preparedness
Equipment Support Program

$12 million

1999

County and Municipal Agency Domestic
Preparedness Equipment Support Program

$37.1 million

State Domestic Preparedness Equipment
Program
2000-2001

2002

State Domestic Preparedness Equipment
Program

$53.8 million
$2.9 million

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic
Preparedness Equipment Program

$15 million

State Domestic Preparedness Equipment
Program

$145.3 million

State Domestic Preparedness Program

$315 million

Citizen Corps and CERT Grants (FEMA)
$21 million
2003

CERT Guidance (FEMA)

$19 million

UASI Port Security Grant Program

$75 million

UASI Transit Security Grant Program

$65 million

UASI Grant Program I

$96 million

UASI Grant Program II

$506 million

State Homeland Security Grant Program

$566 million

State Homeland Security Grant Program II

$1.5 billion

While the funding of preparedness and research has proven to be an important
aspect of the new Department’s activity, legislative process did more than simply inject
distributive concerns into the architecture of DHS. It also diluted the extent to which
lawmakers considered the prescriptive merits of reorganization, or reorganized the
internal distribution of legislative committee jurisdiction to realize those benefits.
The overt rationale for creating the massive agency was coordination. Yet the
prescriptive benefits of reorganization are highly uncertain. Centralization creates a far
more massive organization, implying that organizational leaders have much greater
difficulty mastering the various pieces. Department leaders’ difficulties in managing
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FEMA and its natural disaster mission have made this plain.134 Centralization may also
contribute to greater monopolization of functions within the government, yielding less
competition among bureaus and dissipating the potential benefits of competition.
Reorganization creates considerable uncertainty about future career paths for bureaucrats.
Those whose futures have been downgraded or who face the most uncertainty are most
likely to work less hard or leave the agency. This too has become evident in FEMA, as
many of its former employees simply left.135 Finally, substantial short-run costs arise
from centralization as agencies undergo the transactions costs of integrating personal,
information, financial, management, and field systems. These raise serious questions –
almost entirely neglected in the legislative process – about whether centralization on the
scale of DHS has had a net increase in the effective provision of homeland security.136
A second prescriptive problem legislators neglected involved the mismatch of
congressional jurisdictions and bureaucratic centralization. Although the reorganization
made massive changes in bureaucratic organization, Congress declined to engineer the
parallel changes in congressional oversight. The House Judiciary committee is
particularly illustrative. Among the Judiciary Committee’s many amendments, the
committee voted to transfer only the law enforcement functions of INS to DHS, keeping
the citizenship functions at the Department of Justice (DOJ) and, obviously, under the
purview of the committee. Besides retaining their oversight functions, the Judiciary
Committee also voted to increase their responsibility by approving an amendment to
transfer the Secret Service and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center from
Treasury to the DOJ.137 The House leadership did create a special nine-member Select
Committee on Homeland Security in July 2002 to screen the changes made by individual
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committees,138 but House Speaker Hastert largely populated this panel with committee
chairs who could protect their jurisdiction.139 Legislators also showed significant
resistance at the time the HSA was passed. President Bush reportedly made some early
attempts to encourage Congress to solve the jurisdictional issue,140 but legislators
essentially ignored him.
The massive bureaucratic reorganization unaccompanied by any congressional
reorganization implies that the structure of bureaucratic incentives induced by
congressional oversight work against the effects of centralization. This problem raises
another variant of the congressional common pool problem: though all members may
have wanted to achieve significant homeland security improvement, they also sought to
control a piece of the bureaucracy. Doing so, legislators could claim credit for steering
policy in a highly-salient domain,141 and for steering funds in directions benefiting
constituents. Many members of the relevant subcommittees have specialized in helping
existing constituents of the agencies being moved to DHS. To the extent that coordination
lowers the level of service legislators could provide to their constituents, these members
are likely to use their oversight jurisdiction to impede coordination.142
Because the creation of the DHS made massive changes to the bureaucracy while
leaving the existing structure of congressional jurisdictions in place, congressional
incentives cut against the goals of centralization and coordination.143 The piecemeal set
of congressional jurisdictions reflected the old set of priorities; in particular, a set of
agencies that did not coordinate. Much of the lack of coordination under the old system
represents a set of diverse agencies serving diverse constituencies overseen by a diverse
set of subcommittees. Leaving the old congressional jurisdictions intact allows
representatives of the old, uncoordinated system to pull their agencies away from the
coordination-related goals of the new system and to continue to serve their old
constituents’ interests. In addition, leaving the existing distribution of committee
jurisdiction yields another problem interfering with the potential benefits of
centralization: the new agency’s leaders must report to all of the separate congressional
committees, depleting the time they can devote to coordinating the Department. In a less
sprawling reorganization, such reporting demands may prove less problematic. Not so
with DHS; by 2004, department officials were called to testify – on average – about
twenty times a month.144
Yet most of these prescriptive concerns – whether about the merits of
centralization, or about the need to overhaul congressional committee jurisdiction in
order to capture the benefits of centralization – were cast aside. Instead, senior legislators
138

See supra note __, at __ (discussing the establishment of the select committee).
Edward Epstein, Homeland Security in Hot Seat; Top 4 in Bush's Cabinet Try to Head Off Partisan Turf
Wars, S.F. CHRON (July 12, 2004), accessed January 1, 2006.
140
Lydia Adetunji, Bush Warns of Homeland Security Turf Battles Ahead, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2002,
accessed December 12, 2005.
141
See Fiorina, Congress: Keystone, supra note __.
142
For a discussion of a similar strategic problem arising in the context of closing military bases, see Dalton
v. Specter, 114 S.Ct. 1719 (1994).
143
Fiorina makes this point more generally. See Morris P. Fiorina, “Congressional Control of the
Bureaucracy," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered 2nd ed. (1981).
144
See Susman, supra note __, at 3.
139

42
from both parties maneuvered to preserve their committees’ power. And the parties
themselves competed in trying to take credit for an impending reorganization with
growing public salience. In the process, Republicans appear to have baited the
Democrats on several issues, notably the drug liability and civil service exemptions. In
the debate just prior to the 2002 elections, several visible Democrats opposed these
provisions. The strategy seemed to work: those Democrats who opposed these provisions
were painted as being against homeland security, and several key members, most notably
Senator Max Cleland, lost their reelection bids.145 In the weeks before the November 5,
2002 midterm Congressional election, polling results reveal that the public viewed the
President and the Republican Party as better at handling national security-related issues.
In a poll of registered voters, a July 2002 CBS News/New York Times poll found that
49% of respondents thought that the Republican party would be “more likely to make the
right decisions when it comes to dealing with terrorism,” as compared to only 22% who
believed the Democratic party would do so.146 These results suggest that voters
responded to a successful effort by the President and the Republicans to project a
favorable image of their handling of homeland security immediately prior to the midterm
election.
B. The Political Influence of the President
Along with Congress, the President exerted considerable influence over the
creation of DHS, with the massive scope the reorganization plan a case in point. But
given the extent of the legislature’s influence, the White House’s role in the
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reorganization raises the question of whether the President was merely responding to
external pressure.
Consistent with such a conjecture, some observers place considerable explanatory
weight on the existence of what might be termed a “bandwagon” effect, where the
President’s hand was forced by growing legislative interest in creating the new
Department. To the extent that some form of reorganization was likely to pass, the
argument presumes, the President’s public image was best served by being in favor of
DHS rather than by opposing it and losing.147 Moreover, perhaps the president also had
an incentive to differentiate his plan from others so as to be able to claim credit for the
reorganization.148
Although the bandwagon effect undoubtedly came into play – and may even
explain the president’s initial willingness to revisit the creation of the Department – it
cannot explain the details of the White House proposal, such as why the President’s
alternative plan was so massive. The President could have gotten on the bandwagon with
a reorganization only modestly different from those already being Congress, and would
have almost certainly heightened the possibility of its adoption by proposing a smaller
reorganization devoid of features such as assistant secretary positions not subject to
Senate confirmation that were designed to heighten presidential influence.149 Viewed
from this perspective, a reorganization of comparatively larger scope and size may have
posed a heightened risk to the President’s image as an effective leader.
To explain why the reorganization included so many different bureaucracies, we
raise another piece of the puzzle. Why did Bush, so fiscally profligate in general, insist
that the DHS be “revenue neutral?” The stated rationale for the large DHS umbrella was
that centralization and coordination would improve homeland security. Yet this rationale
alone cannot explain why centralization went so far to include so many agencies (and
parts of agencies) whose missions are so tangential to homeland security. As we have
seen, the uncertainty about the effects of reorganization combined with the lack of
congressional jurisdictional reorganization to question whether centralization would yield
net benefits for homeland security. Reflecting Bush’s initial misgivings about
reorganization, the administration understood these problems in advance, and these
weighed against centralization.
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Our thesis is that a major reason why DHS encompassed a massive reorganization
is that it furthers Bush’s domestic policy interests that are largely independent of
homeland security. Indeed a major consequence of the new DHS structure – perhaps the
most important consequence – concerns domestic policy, not homeland security.
Legislators understood that the creation of the new department would inevitably have
consequences for domestic policy. First, legislators were clearly concerned about what
the new department would mean for the important non-security duties for which the
agencies in question were charged. Much of the early debate in Congress about the
president’s proposal focused on whether, for example, it was wise to transfer FEMA and
the Coast Guard to DHS given their domestic policy mandates. As noted above, the
legislation addressed this directly.150
The HSA demonstrates the extent to which political actors recognized the
domestic regulatory policy stakes of the creation of the Department.151 The committee
report accompanying legislation concludes:
[M]any agencies within the Department… perform important non-homeland
security missions that Americans rely on every day. The Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service protects ecosystems from invasive species. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency assists local communities to prepare for and
respond to natural disasters. The U.S. Coast Guard performs essential maritime
search and rescue, fisheries enforcement, marine safety, marine environmental
protection, navigation assistance, and migrant interdiction functions. The
Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services provides asylum for refugees and assists immigrants in becoming
American citizens. The Customs Service protects and monitors foreign trade that
is essential for a healthy American economy. The Secret Service monitors and
protects against identity theft, counterfeiting, and other financial crimes.152
Nonetheless, the provisions in the bill also demonstrate how, despite these concerns, the
explicit terms of legislative compromise creating DHS allow for a diminution in domestic
regulatory activities. Put simply, the DHS provides a statutory and organizational
framework that allows Bush officials to divert a wide range of resources from agency
legacy mandates to homeland security activities. Regardless of whether these activities,
tangential to homeland security, have any impact on security, the administration has
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reason to value the diversion of resources out of the legacy mandates it finds worthy of
disapproval.
The potential to reshaping legal implementation through reorganization can be
further grasped by contrasting it to strategies deployed by the Reagan Administration. A
major policy goal of President Ronald Reagan was to reduce what many Republicans
believed as a bloated federal government. This included a wide range of governmental
programs that they did not value or believed outright harmful to the economy. Reagan
was ideologically against an elaborate regulatory state that he disparagingly termed “big
government.” When he took office, he appointed a range of administrative heads who
shared his views. Many sought to sabotage their agency’s efforts, in part by simply
stopping the agency’s efforts to enforce the law.153
This strategy failed. Constituencies benefiting from the agency’s regulation took
the agencies to court in an attempt to get them to enforce the existing set of laws
administered by the relevant agencies. The courts agreed and, absent agency proceedings
that decided on a different enforcement strategy, forced them to continue administering
the law as they had. Ann Gorsuch’s leadership of the EPA illustrates this failure. Her
attempts to slash the agency’s budget and failure to uphold environmental laws led to her
resignation.154
Bush’s goals were not the same as Reagan’s, and he did not appear to share the
full extent of Reagan’s ideological commitment to the market.155 Like Reagan, however,
Bush believed a wide range of domestic programs should be outside the purview of the
national government. The Reagan administration’s experience nonetheless demonstrated
that the strategy of direct sabotage, shirking, and neglect of the law was unlikely to work.
But, as we have seen, crises have a capacity to change the political equation. One
such change – which may have initially seemed unrelated to the Administration’s
regulatory and administrative agenda – involved the President’s homeland security
agenda. Even after the September 11 attacks, the President was reluctant to create a new
homeland security cabinet agency. Despite the uncertain long-term benefits of
centralizing homeland security and the high transition costs, Congress nonetheless
accepted the reorganization because of their conventional common pool problems. In the
President's case, his revealed preference of no reorganization eventually dissipated in the
face of gathering congressional and public support for reorganization.
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Once the White House recognized that avoiding reorganization altogether was not
an option, the Administration’s strategy became decidedly more ambitious. Perhaps the
September 11 attacks would provide the Bush Administration with a unique opportunity
to reduce a range of domestic policies of which he disapproved. The Coast Guard’s
extensive regulatory functions – including the protection of marine ecosystems, the
regulation of marine safety, and setting requirements for the use of port facilities – were
long unpopular with a number of business constituencies that have often been supportive
of Republicans in recent years, including cargo vessel operators,156 the fishing
industry,157 tanker and oil companies,158 and cruise lines.159 Republicans also questioned
certain FEMA functions that could be framed as essentially social welfare policies,
including its role in food and shelter assistance, non-competitive mitigation grants, and
subsidized flood insurance.160 As historian Douglas Brinkley has written, even just a few
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years after FEMA’s creation, “the incoming Reagan administration saw the outfit as a
feel-good liberal money drain, a cousin to HUD [Department of Housing and Urban
Development] and HEW.”161
The new strategy sought to bring a wide range of agencies with domestic
programs within the umbrella of the DHS. Three separate components of the DHS
umbrella furthered Bush’s domestic policy goals: one legislative, one organizational, and
one budgetary. The legislative component gave all the agencies moved to DHS new
statutory responsibility that differed from their legacy mandates. Specifically, agencies
brought within the umbrella had a new law requiring them to act. In contrast to the
agencies in the Reagan era, the agencies moved to DHS now faced a set of statutes with
conflicting goals – their legacy mandates versus the new homeland security mandate.
Indeed, even before the creation of DHS formalized the importance of the Coast Guard’s
new security priorities, the media began reporting how the agency had been forced to
reorient its resources: “While only 1 percent of [the Coast Guard’s resources were
dedicated to port security before September 11, more than 50 percent of all coast
guardsmen are now [in mid-2002] focused on homeland security.”162 As one longtime
Coast Guard observer noted at the time, “there wasn’t a whole lot of capacity for [the
Coast Guard] essentially to pick up this new mission without it impacting significantly on
its traditional mission.”163
Second, Bush’s insistence that DHS be budget-neutral implied that all resources
devoted by these agencies to homeland security diverted resources from the agencies’
legacy mandates. Budget neutrality forced these agencies to devote fewer resources to
their legacy mandates. The more these agencies spent on homeland security, the less they
spent on their legacy mandates.
Third, placing these agencies within the DHS organizational framework served to
further this diversion of resources. Were the agency left independent or in its former
department, the agency (possibly in collaboration with its former department) would
make the determination of the tradeoff of how much resources to transfer from its legacy
mandate to homeland security concerns. It could, for example, decide that three percent
of its resources is appropriate. Placing these agencies within DHS, however, empowered
Bush administration officials to help make that tradeoff. In particular, placing these
agencies within DHS allowed departmental leaders leverage with which to force agencies
to make a greater tradeoff than they would otherwise; that is, to devote greater resources
to homeland security than the agency would do on its own.
In short, the creation of DHS appears to have allowed Bush to transfer resources
out of agency legacy mandates into new homeland security concerns. Because Bush did
that it could slow emergency response to future flood and hurricane victims, house Republicans have
stripped $389 million in disaster relief money from the budget as part of an effort to keep federal spending
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DeLay and took a tough public stance against a GOP plan to slash FEMA’s disaster assistance.”).
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not value these legacy mandates, this statutory/ bureaucratic approach made him better
off even if the resources diverted from legacy mandates to homeland security activities
produce no tangible homeland security benefits.
Legislators, too, recognized early that DHS was, to some extent, a presidential
power-grab and, as such, made efforts to rein in what they saw as an overextension of
executive power. These attempts can be clearly demonstrated through a comparison of
the president’s initial bill proposal and the resulting HSA. Examples of how legislators
refused to give the president the full authority he desired are repeatedly apparent. The
final bill, for instance, did not give the White House the authority to appoint assistant
secretaries without Senate confirmation, as was requested in the original proposal. Nor,
as previously mentioned, was the president granted the right to control when agencies
were transferred (Section 802 in the proposal) or the allocation of funds from the
transferred agencies to the Secretary of DHS (Section 803 (c) in the proposal). Finally,
Congress voted to include the establishment of the National Homeland Security Council
within the Executive Office—an agency that was not proposed in the president’s plan.
In addition to the legislation’s language, floor statements reveal legislators’
weariness of conferring more power on the president. Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) said
of the HSA in a floor statement to the Senate: “The President is clearly attempting to
remove the limits on his power. I don't question his good intention. Maybe he doesn't
understand what he is doing. But this is clearly an attempt to remove limits on the
Executive's power…”164 This comment is representative of the deep distrust Congress felt
over what they perceived as a presidential grab for increased authority.
Legislators’ efforts to control presidential power indicate the extent to which the
President viewed the fight over DHS not only as one over the appropriate degree of
centralization that should govern homeland security policy, but over the extent of direct
presidential control over the regulatory, bureaucratic, and legal functions that would be
vested in the new department. Although legislative responses limited how much power
the President achieved through the HSA, its creation significantly enhanced the power of
the executive. The new law allowed the President to select a cadre of political appointees
to oversee twenty-two agencies lodged in a new bureaucracy with the daunting mission
of protecting the homeland while continuing to carry out non-homeland security
missions. After a tense fight in Congress, the Department civil service employees were
also subject to more flexible personnel rules, thereby allowing political appointees to
control them more readily.
The umbrella structure had another, organizational effect that served the same
purpose of increasing executive power. By virtue of being placed within DHS, the DHS
hierarchy could make it clear to the bureaucrats specializing in the legacy mandates that
they were no longer the agency’s priority, and therefore were less likely to be promoted
into the agency’s senior management. All this meant that these bureaucrats would be
treated less well, and would be more likely to leave.165 At the very least, the DHS
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umbrella gave Bush officials and agency leaders opposed to the agency’s legacy mandate
additional tools with which to sabotage the agency’s ability to perform their legacy legal
mandates.166
As a result, the creation of DHS appears to represent a clever domestic political
innovation, allowing Bush to attain goals in ways that Reagan failed. Reagan’s direct
attempt to circumvent or ignore domestic regulatory laws largely ended in disaster.167 By
giving the Bush administration new statutory and organizational tools, the DHS umbrella
provided the legal means to divert considerable resources away from domestic legacy
mandates.
C. The Role of the Post-9/11 Crisis
The crisis following the September 11 attacks had several predictable effects on
the policymaking process concerning homeland security. First, it gave the president an
issue from which he could launch a new phase of his theretofore lackluster presidency
and his rapidly declining public approval rating. The weekend before the 9/11 attacks,
President Bush received a job approval rating of 51%; by September 21, 2001, his job
approval rating had skyrocketed to a record-breaking 90%.168 But this popularity was
relatively short-lived as Bush’s approval rating steadily dropped over the next eight
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turnover, constantly changing priorities and splict responsibilities among federal agencies… sap the
nation’s ability…”); Homeland Security Struggles with ‘Extraordinary’ Turnover, EXTREMETECH.COM
(June 10, 2005) avail. at 2005 WLNR 9519206; Chris Cillizza, Bills Scold Executive Branch, ROLL CALL
(May 25, 2005) avail. at 2005 WLNR 8280726 (“Homeland Security has had two secretaries and three
deputy secretaries in its brief existence. More than 40 percent of high-level staff positions are currently
vacant.”).
166
Our analysis of the potential policy payoffs to the White House from expansive reorganization raises two
additional questions. First, if the Administration’s inclusion of regulatory agencies within DHS was partly
motivated by a desire to control and curtail administrative and regulatory activity, why did some
Democratic proposals also include large regulatory agencies such as the Coast Guard? Although
Lieberman’s proposal was nearly as large in scope as Bush’s, the context and substance of their proposals
differed in important ways. Lieberman was likely motivated by the prospect of grabbing power for the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, in which he played a leading role. Moreover, as Part I notes,
Bush’s proposal was not only larger in the end, but its development nearly resulted in the inclusion of even
more regulatory agencies that were not included in Democratic proposals – such as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Federal Aviation Administration. In addition, Bush’s proposal included elements
expanding presidential power by weakening of civil service and provisions to appoint Assistant Secretaries
without Senate confirmation. Finally, as we note below, Bush’s proposal was coupled with moves to
impose budgetary restrictions on agencies so as to force agencies to substitute homeland security efforts for
their legacy mandates. The second question is why the Department was not even larger. As with past
reorganization efforts, the White House was likely to best achieving its goals by balancing the costs and
benefits of marginal increases in the scope and size of the department. (1) Legislative resistance from
affected committees would be greater as more functions were placed in the department; (2) the hidden
domestic policy implications of the reorganization might become starkly apparent to the public; and (3)
there might be a genuine risk that even more massive reorganizations would adversely impact critical
functions such as air traffic control (which was considered and ultimately rejected as a candidate for
inclusion).
167
See supra notes 154-156 (discussing the limits of President Reagan’s capacity to dilute regulatory
enforcement).
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Frank Newport, The American Public Reacts, THE GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, (September 24, 2001),
avail. at www.gallup.org. Last accessed January 14, 2006.
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months to a post-9/11 low of 70% immediately before the DHS announcement. Because
of the sharp decline in presidential popularity, the White House must have felt pressure to
produce additional terrorism-related policy; the USA Patriot Act, creation of the TSA, the
invasion of Afghanistan and a spate of other executive actions were not enough.
Bush therefore sought to take visible command of the policymaking process and
shepherded the various legislation through the process, legislation that had clearly
become his and not that of the Congress. To do so, he had to provide a plan that
differentiated his administration’s proposal from those under discussion in Congress.
Perhaps the most important aspect of a crisis is that the attentive public demanded
quick action. Especially in a national security crisis where the public feels vulnerable,
quick action is needed to assure citizens that their risk has been significantly lowered.
Perhaps most significantly, the public cares deeply about terrorism and homeland security
issues. Even before 9/11, Gallup reported that a significant proportion of Americans were
concerned about being victims of a terrorist attack. In a poll in April 2000, Gallup found
that 24% of respondents were either very or somewhat worried that they or someone in
their family would be a victim of an Oklahoma City-style bombing.169 In January of
2001, Gallup found that 47% of respondents reported that it was somewhat or very likely
that terrorists or another country using nuclear weapons within the next ten years would
attack the U.S.170
The public’s concern increased over time,171 and coincided with broad public
support for reorganization. Although only limited public opinion data are available
regarding the creation of DHS, available data suggests that Americans generally
supported idea of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security even before the
President’s announcement.172 Additionally, a January 31, 2002 poll found that 84% of
respondents approved of Bush’s request to spend $38 billion on homeland security.173
After President Bush made the June 7, 2002 announcement in which he endorsed the
creation of DHS, public opinion reflected a belief that DHS was a good idea. In a typical
poll, Gallup found that 72% of respondents approved of the creation of DHS.174 The
widespread popularity of reorganization suggests the potential position-taking benefit that
politicians could achieve by supporting the creation of DHS.
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Terrorist Attacks: Public Opinion from April 1995-January 2001, THE GALLUP POLL NEW SERVICE,
(September 11, 2001), avail. at www.gallup.org. Last accessed January14, 2006.
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Id.
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In the weeks following the attacks, as might be expected, the number of respondents concerned about
terrorism increased, with 48% of respondents reporting that they were somewhat or very worried that they
or someone in their family would be a victim of a terrorist attack. Gallup Poll, September 20-21, 2001.
www.gallup.com. Last accessed January 14, 2006.
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In a Time/CNN/Harris poll in late September 2001, 56% of respondents believed that the Office of
Homeland Security would make the country safer. Survey by Time, Cable News Network and Harris
Interactive, September 27, 2001. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center
for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
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Survey by The Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2002. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from the iPOLL
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
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Frank Newport, Americans Approve of Proposed Department of Homeland Security, THE GALLUP POLL
NEWS SERVICE (June 10, 2002) avail. at www.gallup.org. Last accessed January 14, 2006
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As legislators and the President pursued the creation of the massive department,
the public’s inability to assess the intricacies of the plan had three separate effects on
crisis policymaking. First, citizens demand for action induced political officials to prefer
quick action that is less well-considered and well-designed to slower action that is better
considered and better-designed. Second, the need to pass something quickly also allowed
political officials to hide other initiatives with very different aims within the plans to
address the crisis. Third, the demanding public, unable to analyze the implications of
transition costs or organizational details, put legislators seeking better plans (or who
oppose the plans) at a political disadvantage. Opposition most ostensibly delays action,
and if the public cannot appreciate the policy-specificity of the argument, those seeking
to improve the process appear simply as opponents. Again, this clearly occurred in the
case of Max Cleland.175 All three effects appeared to have an impact on homeland
security policymaking.
D. Budget Politics and Legacy Mandates
Evidence from the budgets of transferred agencies is consistent with the
hypothesis that reorganization was a means of furthering domestic legal and policy goals.
First, in his initial proposal to create the department, Bush repeatedly promised that DHS
would be “revenue-neutral,” meaning that the new department would not cost any more
than the combined budgets of its component parts.176 Table 4 indicates that the Bush
Administration’s projected budgets for the Department of Homeland Security in FY 2003
and 2004 held resources constant compared to the 2002 figures (once we include both
actual and supplemental expenditures). We argue that this push for budget-neutrality
implies that the Administration had ulterior motives for the creation of DHS; namely, that
by giving new homeland security mandates to the agencies within DHS and by not giving
the agencies any new funding to perform these mandates, the president forced resources
out of legacy regulatory functions of the agencies transferred to DHS.
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This aspect of the DHS suggests the impact of voters’ knowledge and sophistication, and not just the
salience of the underlying issue, on the allocation of legal responsibilities across bureaucracies. Cf.
Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political
Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951 (2001)(the use of cognitive short-cuts, or heuristics increase the
probability of a correct vote by political experts but decrease the probability of a correct vote by novices).
But see Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins, The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence:
How Citizens Learn What They Need to Know, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: CONGITION, CHOICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 47 (Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin, eds. 2000)(lowinformation rationality and political competence are possible through heuristics and institutions allowing
citizens to interpret complex information). These is little doubt that voters with limited knowledge can
often make reasonable choices by analyzing the behavior of organized interests (and by drawing on
perceptions about the relationship of their own views to those of the relevant organized interests). But
voters’ relative ignorance about the intricacies of legislative proposals may be especially likely to affect
political circumstances during crises, where policy changes may happen more rapidly, and in circumstances
where prominent organized interests (such as the NRA or the ACLU) do not take an explicit position. Both
of those conditions were present when the HSA was under consideration.
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See Take Time on Homeland Plan, HARTFORD COURANT A8 (June 20, 2002)(“Mr. Bush says his
proposal will be revenue-neutral…”); Looking for Fiscal Patriots, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL 10
(June 17, 2002) avail. at 2002 WLNR 3684322 (“Mr. Bush’s proposed Department of Homeland Security
would be revenue neutral, the president’s aides insist…”).
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Table 4: Bush Administration Projections of Discretionary Budget Authority for the
Department of Homeland Security, FY 2002-2004 (in millions)177

Discretionary
Authority

Budget

2002 (actual & supplemental)

2003

2004

31,051

27,884

29,185

In succeeding years, Departmental spending exceeded the Bush Administration’s
initial projections.178 But once we remove supplemental appropriations such as those
funding the aftermath of disasters such as Katrina, a different picture emerges. As Figure
1 indicates, overall discretionary funding for DHS remained relatively constant between
2003 and 2006, and the President’s request for 2007 continues the pattern.179 The key
comparison in the figure is between total DHS funding (excluding supplementals) and
DHS homeland security spending. Because the latter rises faster than the former, it shows
that DHS spending on legacy mandates decreased.
Although the budget for DHS and its components appears to have increased
substantially, much of the increase occurred through a supplemental appropriation before
the new Department had been created and reflected, in large measure, disaster related
expenditures associated with the September 11 attacks, new grant programs, and the
creation of the TSA.180
Figure 1
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U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 161 (2003).
See Budget of the United States 2007, Historical Tables (2006).
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See id.
180
See Budget of the United States 2004: Department of Homeland Security (2003)(showing the size of
supplemental appropriations as a proportion of total resources provided for DHS bureaus in 2002).
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An even more telling picture emerges from the breakdown of appropriations
flowing to DHS on the basis of whether the Office of Management and Budget considers
an appropriation to be primarily homeland security-related or non-homeland securityrelated.181 Total DHS discretionary funds flowing to DHS have remained essentially flat,
but the dedicated homeland security resources within the department have consistently
risen. As Figure 2 shows, the proportion of resources flowing to functions most directly
related to homeland security has increased from about 65% to roughly 90% during the
life of the Department. Admittedly, the appropriations designated as primarily homeland
security-related almost certainly have the potential to provide a measure of non-security
benefits.182 It is revealing, however, that the White House directly identifies an
increasingly dominant share of the Department’s resources with security-related
missions.183
Figure 2
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See Budget of the United States 2004, Analytical Perspectives (2003); Budget of the United States 2005,
Analytical Perspectives (2004); Budget of the United States 2006, Analytical Perspectives (2005); and
Budget of the United States 2007, Analytical Perspectives (2006).
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As best we can tell, OMB’s definition of “homeland security” focuses on the protection of the American
national territory, and its population and infrastructure, from manmade threats. See supra Part I for
examples of other sources that have defined the term in a similar fashion.
183
Even if the resources of departments and bureaus were growing overall, changes in the proportion of
resources dedicated to a particular mission alter internal and external perceptions of a bureau’s mission, the
allocation of time and attention of its leadership, and its relationships to external constituencies. Cf.
LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICS: MOTOR FREIGHT POLICY AT
THE ICC (1994)(describing how the organization’s priorities, internal culture, and relationships with
external interests shifted as the proportion of economic activity it regulated increasingly involved trucking
instead of rail transportation).
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We can learn still more about budgetary developments by going beyond broad
funding categories and examining patterns involving individual bureaus. As Table 5
indicates, some agencies that clearly encompass both traditional homeland security
functions as well as domestic regulatory activities did experience budget increases.
Table 5: Budget Authority of Selected DHS Sub-Agencies, FY2000-2004184
APHIS
(millions)
Coast Guard
(billions)
FEMA
(billions)

FY2001
634

FY2002
880

FY2003
1145

FY2004
813

3.3

3.8

4.9

4.7

2.4

3.1

6.6

4.7

But here too, a different picture emerges from the details. Consider first the Coast
Guard. Some of the budget increases for the Coast Guard cover long-anticipated
infrastructure needs, and only to a partial degree.185 Despite the flow of some additional
resources to the bureau, some legislators maintain that the agency not received adequate
resources to carry out its new mandates. In a debate during the Coast Guard
reauthorization process, Representative Howard Coble commented “that the Coast Guard
leaders ‘must have a magic wand’ because he said they have seamlessly assumed a range
of new responsibilities without corresponding increases in funding.”186 Moreover,
individual appropriations account for the Coast Guard tell a story of shifting priorities.
Several major programs of the Coast Guard experienced a sharp decline around 2003;
most notably, these programs include Marine Environmental Protection and Search and
184

Figures drawn from the official budget authority figures of separate agencies, drawn either from their
websites or from OMB. Details on file with author.
185
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See MICHAEL E. O’HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: ONE YEAR ON xix (2 ed.
2003)(noting that new Coast Guard funds “are doing little more than addressing previous shortfalls,” and
amount to “hardly a change commensurate with the new responsibilities of this agency”).
186
Kathleen Hunter, House Adopts Revision to Coast Guard Reauthorization, C.Q. TODAY,
June 26, 2006.
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Rescue, both of which were on a fairly strong upward budgetary trajectory since 1996.187
On the other hand, as Figure 3 indicates, programs focused on security-related issues,
such as Defense Readiness and Marine Safety and Security experienced a dramatic
increase in the same period.
Figure 3
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Similar budgetary developments affected the administrative functions of FEMA.
FEMA’s budget has two distinct components: responding to specific disasters, such as
Katrina; and (“base”) funding for FEMA’s administrative capacity, mitigation grants, and
discretionary disaster relief programs. The increase in FEMA’s budget shown in Table 5
reflects both the core program budget as well as special appropriations for specific
disasters such as the September 11 terrorist attacks that Congress and the President would
find politically costly to ignore. In contrast, FEMA’s ongoing administrative and
discretionary functions, including activities such as oversight of disaster relief spending,
flood insurance, and mitigation grants, may attract less public attention while inviting
political controversy. As Figure 4 indicates, if we focus on FEMA’s base budget, it
becomes clear that FEMA’s funding has remained essentially flat (or slightly declined)
since the creation of DHS. By adding responsibilities and restricting FEMA’s core
resources, budgetary developments since the merger further strained FEMA’s
administrative capacities and its available resources for discretionary mitigation
programs.188

Figure 4
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See Office of Management and Budget, Budget Authority File, 1976-2007, PUBLIC BUDGET DATABASE
(2006), avail. at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/db.html.
188
See Democratic Staff, House Appropriations Committee, A Story of Neglect: A Review of FEMA and the
Army Corps of Engineers in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Staff Report (Sept. 8, 2005).
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FEMA Base Funding Authorization (millions)
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E. The Consequences of Reorganization
Our theoretical framework provides answers to the puzzles stated at the outset.
Consider the first two puzzles: Why is DHS so big, including so many agencies whose
mission is tangentially related to homeland security? Part of the answer is that Bush
sought to take the lead in providing homeland security. But he also used the DHS
umbrella as a means for disguising a wide-ranging transformation of domestic policies.
Forcing them under the homeland security umbrella had two separate, reinforcing effects.
First, the reorganization forced agencies to transfer resources formerly devoted to their
legacy mandates to homeland security concerns. Second, the new organizational control
allowed the administration to downplay the portions of the organization that remained
focused on the legacy mandates, further disrupting the agency’s ability to serve this
mandate. Bush valued this transformation, not necessarily because this improved
homeland security, but because this transforms a variety of domestic programs. Finally,
consider the third puzzle: why did Bush insist that this policy be budget neutral despite
the fact that he’s been so profligate in other areas? The answer is that budget neutrality is
a central tool in forcing agencies to transform their operations so that they transfer
resources out of their legacy mandates.
Another way to understand the dynamic of domestic regulatory impacts
associated with the creation of DHS is to contrast it with an alternative administrative
approach. Suppose instead of creating a massive new department, Congress had
mandated that agencies undertake a “Homeland Security Impact Statement” (HSIS) in
parallel with the Environmental Impact Statements created in 1969. The HSIS would
require agencies to study the impact of their proposed policies – and possibly also
existing ones – on homeland security. As with EIS’s, HSIS’s are likely to have had mixed
implications. To be done seriously, they would take considerable effort. And, as with
EIS’s, the procedural nature of the exercise does not compel any policy changes.
Moreover, this approach would not achieve Bush’s domestic policy goals of forcing
agencies to substitute a considerable portion of resources and personal away from their
legacy mandates.
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Ironically, shifting the focus away from legacy mandates does not necessarily
enhance the effectiveness of security policies. The distributive tendency has distorted
DHS’s spending priorities away from high risk targets to areas of significantly lower
priority.189 The lack of reorganization of congressional oversight jurisdictions works to
preserve the non-coordination status quo, directly hindering the goal of centralization and
coordination. Partisan goals led to some extreme measures relatively independent of the
goal of homeland security.
Indeed, the disastrous performance of DHS and FEMA in the aftermath of the
August 2005 Hurricane Katrina is a natural consequence of a political process that played
down transition costs and structural problems associated with the creation of DHS.
Recall that the DHS merger accelerated a process through which FEMA’s natural disaster
and mitigation missions were eviscerated.190 As the legacy missions were downgraded,
many of experienced workers left the agency.191 Both a congressional committee and the
White House issued reports detailing the mistakes made during the recovery efforts
following the hurricane. The reports show how FEMA and DHS were unprepared for an
emergency on the scale of Katrina. Both DHS and FEMA were indicted for “lack[ing]
adequate trained and experienced staff.”192 The White House report suggests that certain
189

Although DHS has taken some steps to preserve and expand the role of technical risk analysis in the
allocation of homeland security-related grant funds, such efforts have played out against a backdrop of
pressures forcing DHS to allocate funds in accordance with external political dynamics. Two of the three
major grant programs – the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program and the State Homeland
Security Grant Program – have statutory baseline formulas that flatly require nearly half the money to be
allocated equally on a state-by-state basis, with .75% of total funds going to each state and .25% of total
funds allocated to a list of territories. See Shawn Reese, Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program
Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RL33583 22 (August 1, 2006). In
addition, the extent to which the Department has described recent changes as gradual moves to implement a
more risk-based methodology suggest that the original allocation formulas more thoroughly reflected the
influence of political pressures on DHS. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. and Scott Higham, Politics Cast
Shadow on 9-11 Funds, CINCINNATI POST K1, Dec. 26, 2005, avail. at 2005 WLNR 22002388.
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consolidation of numerous federal agencies under the umbrella of DHS, many stakeholders have been
concerned about the dilution of the FMEA missions of response, recovery and mitigation of all hazards –
including natural disasters.”). For a cogent argument explaining why it is problematic to assume that
capacity to respond to natural disasters and to terrorist attacks are fungible, see Patrick S. Roberts,
Reputation and Federal Emergency Preparedness Agencies, 1948-2003, PAPER PRESENTED AT THE 2004
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS’N MEETING 29 (Sept. 2, 2004)(on file with author):
There are reasons to believe that terrorism is incompatible with the definition of all hazards that
existed before September 11. Terrorism lacks predictability and clear definitions: the enemy is
elusive and it is unclear who or what should be involved in prevention and response. Weapons
could be biological, radiological, chemical, or traditional arms, and the medical and damage
control elements of response overlap with law enforcement and investigative elements.
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See Bruce Alpert, Senators Get An Earful on FEMA, SBA: Horror Tales Feature Ineptitude, Delays,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE 2, May 20, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 8696865 (“[C]onsistent turnover
of personnel at FEMA forced them to start over multiple times in [citizens’] efforts for reimbursement or
help”); Frank Davies, Doubts Persist About FEMA’s Ability to Respond, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER 42, May
7, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 7937023 (“FEMA lost many top professionals in the past few years, and the
turnover continued after Katrina. In March [2006] a House committee reported that only 73% of FEMA
staff positions were filled.”).
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disaster recovery responsibilities be transferred out of DHS, and considers the possibility
of having DOJ oversee law enforcement and having HHS take over distributing aid to
victims.193 The congressional report goes beyond the conclusion that DHS and FEMA
were unprepared. Its analysis highlights the problems resulting from a structure where
layers of organization separated the White House from the operational command and
technical advice most directly associated with the disaster response.194 The report
concludes that, had the structure worked better, the response to Katrina would have
commenced several days earlier than it did.195 An internal DHS Inspector General also
said as much.196
The storm and floods would have produced a crisis of major proportions under
almost any circumstances. But the available evidence suggests that the structural
problems associated with DHS – particularly early in the cycle of its existence – made

Response to Hurricane Katrina, http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm (Last accessed March 21,
2006).
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Secretary of Homeland Security became the President’s principla disaster advisor… As part of
these changes, critical response decisions were assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security
[who] executed these responsibilities late, ineffectively, or not at all.
195
See id. at 132: “[A]bsent a catastrophic disaster designation from [Homeland Security Secretary]
Chertoff, federal response officials in the field eventually made the difficult decisions to bypass established
procedures and provide assistance without waiting for… clear direction from Washington.” Moreover, “the
federal government stumble into a proactive response during the first several days after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall, as opposed to the Secretary making a clear and decisive choice to respond proactively…”
Id. These events, according to the congressional report, did not merely reflect personal failures on the part
of the Secretary, but were largely grounded in structural problems: “The White House Homeland Security
Council, situated at the apex of the policy coordination framework for DHS issues, itself failed to
proactively de-conflict varying damage assessments.” Id. In the weeks immediately before Katrina
arrived, Secretary Chertoff had already begun planning extensive efforts to redefine the relationship
between the White House, the DHS secretariat, and FEMA. These efforts also suggest the presence of
pervasive structural problems in the flow of information, decisions, responses, and coordination efforts
governing disaster response. For a description of those efforts, see Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY,
DEP’T
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SECURITY
(July
13,
2005),
avail.
at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0703.xml.
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See Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster management
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL OIG-06-32 23 (March 2006)(“FEMA and DHS were adjusting to the national response plan”).
The report emphasizes the transition costs associated with changes in the national response plan governing
federal efforts after a disaster. For a discussion of how post-Katrina oversight of allegedly emergency
expenditures at DHS continued to break down even after Katrina, see Mimi Hall, GAO: TV, iPods Part of
Post-Katrina Waste, USA TODAY 3A, July 19, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 12394508 (“Homeland Security
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suggests that the degree of inappropriate expenditures considerably exceeded what would have been
ordinarily expected in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
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things worse.197 Even if one makes unrealistic assumptions about the potential
coordination payoffs over time, the shortcomings in FEMA’s and DHS’ response to
Katrina are consistent with the existence of steep transition costs.
Nor was FEMA the only bureau to suffer in the reorganization. Problems also
arose in other units, such as TSA. The completion of its headquarters facility was
delayed by the transfer to DHS.198 Its internal structure was reorganized to remove
federal air marshals from its jurisdiction.199 Like FEMA and other bureaus, the TSA’s
experience demonstrated how the reorganization could trigger a variety of costs affecting
the effective performance of legal mandates, including the need to adopt new
technologies and internal bureaucratic procedures associated with a new department,200
internal competition for control between bureau leaders and higher-level appointees,201
the burdens of adjusting to new management arrangements altering the relationship
between bureaus, other agencies, and the White House.202 Even if one views these
management problems as temporary transition costs, they raise the question of whether
the potential efficiency from the creation of DHS made up for these costs. We will return
to this question in our conclusion.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Though our primary focus has been on explaining the intricacies of DHS and its
legal responsibilities, the following Part discusses two extensions of the argument. First,
we make some cautious observations relevant to the ongoing debates about judicial
deference to agency legal interpretations. Second, we describe how reorganizations
appear to constitute an under-appreciated technique through which executive authorities
enhance control of bureaucratic functions
A. Structural Politics and Agency Legal Interpretations
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The familiar Chevron doctrine holds that courts should defer to “reasonable”
agency interpretations of law where a statute does not explicitly resolve the matter before
a court.203 A vast literature debates the merits of Chevron deference and its associated
doctrines.204 Though engaging that literature is not our primary concern, our analysis
sheds light on certain facets of the debate. In particular, our modest contribution to this
ongoing debate further emphasizes the problems with making blanket assumptions about
expertise or accountability, the two concepts most frequently deployed to support judicial
deference. Given the political and bureaucratic problems that may pervade agencies, the
case for deference is likely to be, at best, heavily context-dependent.
The expertise justifications for deference antedate Chevron.205 Our case study,
rooted in a large literature on the political control of agencies, raises questions about that
rationale by emphasizing the extent to which politics can be expected to interfere with
efforts to build agencies possessed of subtle technical expertise. In particular, large,
umbrella organizations differ considerably from agencies with specific, narrow missions.
When an agency is saddled with such a massive panoply of bureaucratic units and
missions, the nature of its expertise becomes far less obvious. At the very least, it seems
that the case for deferring to expertise is stronger when the interpretation itself were
coming from officials directly involved in policymaking (such as Coast Guard officials)
rather than higher-level political appointees (such as the Secretary or General Counsel of
the Department of Homeland Security). In contrast, at least one prominent scholarly
account argues for the opposite approach – affording greater deference to agency
interpretations originating with an agency head.206
Even leaving aside the question of the precise official whose interpretations merit
deference, the shortcomings associated with DHS furnish reasons for skepticism about
expertise justifications for deference. Perhaps political or distributional considerations
are just one aspect of the process driving the design of agencies. By demonstrating how
agencies may be poorly equipped to achieve their stated goals, however, our case study of
DHS emphasizes the importance of qualifying any expertise argument by acknowledging
(as a starting point) the extent to which agencies may be designed to serve political rather
than principled purposes.
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Similar caveats apply to the accountability arguments for agency deference voiced
by scholars and in court opinions.207 Presumably, accountability justifications are
grounded in the idea that the elected branches are more responsive to public pressures
than the judiciary.208 Ironically, the evidence suggests that the public supported the
creation of DHS because it sought a more effective way of organizing the bureaucratic
units with security-related functions. Our analysis questions whether such gains were
realized in practice. It also shows that this rationale alone fails to explain not only the size
and scope of DHS, but the underlying decision to create it. Moreover, the logic of any
plausible version of the accountability argument seems to depend on a political dynamic
where the Administration receives deference in interpreting the law because it is taking
responsibility for regulatory policy choices.209 The opposite seems to have occurred in
the case of DHS – impacts on regulatory policy, ranging from environmental
enforcement to trade-policy occurred without the President or his Administration taking
explicit responsibility for them.
In short, accountability arguments for deference appear strained in light of how
presidents can use the politics of structure to make regulatory choices more opaque to
voters who are presumed (in most such arguments) to make decisions at least partly on
the basis of regulatory policy. Indeed, even defining accountability in a non-tautological
fashion becomes exceedingly difficult in a world where multiple branches of government
with conflicting agendas are responsive to the political process and crises can increase
public demands for structural changes that are prescriptively troubling.
Our claim here is a limited one. Our criticisms are not of deference, but of the
most commonly-asserted arguments in favor of deference. Although prescriptive
questions about the degree of deference are complex,210 our analysis suggests that acrossthe-board approaches to deference are likely to be difficult to defend.211 If agencies
forged in crisis can be poorly equipped for success and have complicated indirect impacts
on regulatory activity beyond their primary areas of focus, then it is not obvious that
courts are naturally worse interpreters (in terms of some defensible consequentialist
metric) across the board. Evaluating relative merits of courts and agencies as interpreters
in such a world depends on defining concepts such as “accountability” in a non-circular
manner and on empirical guesses about how courts interpret the law compared to
agencies, the potential legislative responses to different regimes. Given the highly
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abstract nature of many discussions regarding the merits of judicial deference to agency
legal interpretations,212 we suspect that it will be fruitful to refocus such discussion on the
context-specific political realities that determine how agencies are actually designed, and
how they are likely to function in the real world. 213
B. Structural Politics and Presidential Control in Other Contexts
Our theory explains how government reorganizations well beyond the context of
DHS can serve as tools for politicians, particularly presidents, to enhance their political
control of the bureaucracy and to reshape how the public views bureaus’ core missions.
Similar dynamics appear to have shaped the stories of two previous, and significant,
reorganizations – the creation of the Federal Security Agency in the late 1930s (which
eventually spawned today’s Departments of Health and Human Services and Education),
and the creation of the Department of Energy under Carter.
In 1939, President Roosevelt finally secured from Congress the reorganization
authority he so aggressively sought. Almost immediately, he merged the functions of
more than a half-dozen independent or subordinate social welfare and regulatory agencies
closely associated with his Administration’s policy priorities to create the Federal
Security Agency (FSA) in 1939. The forerunner of the sprawling Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (now two separate cabinet agencies), the reorganization that
created the FSA appears to have served multiple functions. First, it gave some of the
Administration’s most prized social welfare and regulatory agencies a politically-useful
association with the concept of national security at a time when opposition to Roosevelt
was growing in Congress.214 In effect, the agency served to market (with Roosevelt’s
help) its programs as critical elements of a national security strategy that included
domestic civil defense; programs to promote the economic health and well-being of
Americans who could be called upon to participate directly or indirectly in a war-related
effort; federal involvement in education policy to promote the dissemination of skills
allegedly useful to national defense; and public health efforts designed to limit the extent
to which disease affected national capacity.215 Second, the creation of the FSA allowed
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the new, centralized supervisory staff to function as an additional layer of political
appointees supplementing the meager White House staff.216 Third, the new agency gave
the White House a vehicle that could be used to provide political cover for particularly
sensitive national security projects, such as defensive and offensive biological weapons
research.217
The FSA’s fate suggests that presidential control sought through agency
reorganization to shape public perceptions of the core goals of the affected agencies.
Distinguishing FSA from the current example, Roosevelt appeared to believe that the
benefits in terms of repackaging the agencies outweighed any danger that their flexibility
would actually be diluted because of the new national security mission.
Several decades later, President Carter confronted a deepening energy crisis and
sought to create a new cabinet-level Department of Energy. Although his decision to
seek the creation of the Energy Department was fueled in part by a desire to impress the
mass public with his leadership in a salient issue area, this rationale does not fully the
scope of the Department, or the legal powers the Administration sought to confer on it.
In fact, the Carter Administration sought to enhance presidential power through the
creation of the new department in two ways. First, he sought to give the Secretary – a
political appointee – power to regulate energy prices which had previously been vested in
independent agencies.218 This provoked opposition in Congress, resulting in a
compromise that denied the President some of what he sought but nonetheless enhanced
his legal control over energy policy.219 Second, Carter incorporated a broad range of
agencies with national security responsibilities – most notably the National Laboratories
involved in nuclear weapons design and production then housed in the Energy Research
and Development Administration – in addition to agencies focused on the matters more
directly associated with domestic energy concerns.220 By moving the National
programs run by the Office of Education), the agency was given responsibility for leading biological
weapons research and for assisting in the relocation of Japanese Americans living on the Pacific coast. See
id.
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Laboratories and strategic petroleum reserves into an executive department with a new
mission and a layer of political appointees, the President gained influence over these
functions and over how the public understood their purpose.221
These two additional illustrations show that executive efforts to insist on
“presidential administration” of public bureaucracies long predate recent
Administrations, as do legislative efforts to rein in such moves. And per our study of the
DHS, these two cases also suggest that presidents use reorganizations to achieve a variety
of policy goals, many well hidden from public view. Our tentative conclusion regarding
the value of reorganizations to presidents seeking to enhance bureaucratic control
contrasts with a perspective advanced in some quarters of the literature, suggesting that
presidential efforts to control the bureaucracy began in earnest during the Clinton
Administration.222
CONCLUSIONS
This article used the evolution of homeland security policy after September 11 as
a case study to analyze the allocation of legal authority within the bureaucracy, and the
impact of bureaucratic structure on the implementation of legal mandates. Despite
significant previous scholarship on bureaucracy and the implementation of legal
mandates, such work has not yielded comprehensive theories linking the politics of
bureaucratic structure to the behavior of the mass public in a crisis, inter- and intrabranch bargaining involving the legislature, and specific legal interpretations and policy
outcomes straddling national security and more conventional domestic policy issues. In
part because of these gaps, existing explanations for the creation of the new Department
of Homeland Security have failed to provide adequate answers to crucial questions, such
as why the president switched from opposition to support of the bureaucratic
reorganization and why, after that initial resistance, the scope of his proposal was greater
than that of past and existing proposals.
To address these questions, we began by updating existing theories of the
legislative process to encompass the following four premises: (1) Other things being
equal, politicians seek opportunities to control bureaucratic resources along with
opportunities to signal positions that are appealing to the public, and parties differ in their
substantive policy agendas. (2) The long-term marginal impact of a particular type of
bureaucratic reorganization on the performance of complex legal mandates, such as
promoting homeland security, is far more uncertain than politicians tend to acknowledge.
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Nonetheless, changes in bureaucratic structure can have predictable statutory,
organizational, and budgetary consequences by forcing bureaucracies to cut back on the
performance of particular missions. (3) As the responses to drug scares, energy shortages,
and the September 11 attacks demonstrate, a newly attentive public may favor structural
changes even while they remain ignorant about the details. (4) Even within parties,
legislators have divergent interests depending on their committee assignments and
seniority.
None of these presumptions should be controversial. But taken together, they
hold underappreciated implications for our understanding of the design and
implementation of legal mandates. As individual legislators, the President, and political
parties jockey for advantage, the political game tends to suppress important prescriptive
concerns about the costs and benefits of centralization, the transition costs associated
with reorganizations, and the fit between congressional and executive branch
organization. Moreover, the combined effect of crises and public uncertainty about the
impact of reorganization allow presidents to reshape administrative and regulatory policy
and assert greater control over bureaucratic discretion.
Our evidence suggests the Administration exploited its legislative opening to
enhance presidential control and reshape agencies’ administrative discretion. It chose
that course despite the risks – identified by the White House’s own advisers – that doing
so would adversely affect the performance of the security functions that justified the
merger in the first place.223 The President dismissed early consolidation efforts that
seemed “kind of small to me,” and directed his staff to “think big” as they forged a plan
for the department.224 In response, the secret group that made decisions about what to
include in the President's proposal not only crafted a consolidation plan larger than
anything legislators had, but seriously considered adding three more major regulatory
agencies to DHS – the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATF, and the FAA. Despite the
fact that many legislators anticipated reorganization’s adverse effect on legacy mandates,
the HSA made statutory and organizational changes allowing legacy regulatory and
administrative functions to be compromised.225 Republicans had a long record of
wanting to control and limit the administrative activities of agencies such as FEMA and
the Coast Guard, a goal that was likely to be accomplished if the statutory and
organizational changes made by the HSA were implemented in a revenue-constrained
environment, which is what the President promised.
And excluding supplemental
appropriations, the Administration proved surprisingly adept at keeping revenues flat for
some core functions while shifting resources away from legacy mandates.
The aftershocks from the Administration’s decision to pursue reorganization have
exacted a price, and plainly demonstrate the significance of these dynamics. Key
advisors within the Bush Administration learned early on that creating the Department
risked making the problem of coordinating security worse. The concerns were not
unfounded. Although our paper is not primarily a normative assessment, we can now
revisit – in light of our analysis – the question of whether the creation of DHS enhanced
homeland security. Attributing marginal security-related effects to changes in
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organizational structure is difficult, and indeed, the existence of uncertainty about this
plays a role in our account. Might the uncertainty conceal a positive probability that the
statutory choices made in creating the Department could enhance the security of
Americans at a time when many might be willing to trade off other government services
in exchange for such improvements? We believe the answer is negative. The
department's creation is almost certainly related to a net loss in the efficiencies associated
with homeland security.
To see why, recall that virtually no serious observer questioned that the transition
costs of creating the department would be pronounced.226 The case for transition costs
(defined as obstacles diminishing the department’s efficient output of security-related
services for some discrete length of time) is fairly straightforward. Problems included the
introduction of uncertainty regarding internal lines of authority, disruptions in established
links between bureaucratic sub-units with one another and with the White House, a focus
on setting up internal control structures rather than on performing the agency's
substantive mission, transfer of authority to a department that initially was almost entirely
devoid of resources to monitor all the security-related functions of its new bureaus, a
continuing fragmentation of legislative oversight authority, and a depletion of key staff so
that they could serve on detail in the central department.227 From a circumstantial
perspective, the performance of the TSA during its time at DHS and of FEMA with
Katrina is entirely consistent with the presence of long-term transition costs.228 The
President's tremendous reluctance to create the Department at first in part reflected these
costs.229
The question is then whether the potential security benefits are high enough to
offset the transition costs. And these benefits could presumably come from two sources:
(a) efficiency gains from coordination and centralization, or (b) shifts in resources away
from legacy mandates toward presumably more pressing security-related missions.230
With respect to efficiency gains from coordination and centralization, we found the
Administration's theoretical case unconvincing.231 It provided no reasonable explanation
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for why a single cabinet agency represented an improvement over the Homeland Security
Council structure. No consideration is given in its public communications to the
offsetting advantages of decentralization, which have been central to spurring aggressive
anti-drug enforcement, and may play an important role in intelligence and policy
innovation.232 No discussion exists of the extent to which some agencies across cabinet
departments have better coordination (such as ATF and FBI across Treasury and the
Justice Department) than other agencies within departments such as the Navy and Army
within Defense,233 or DEA and FBI within Justice.234 And no attention is given to the
reality that fragmentation actually persists (even assuming it were helpful) because of the
relative decentralization of congressional control.235
Moreover, a theoretically coherent prescriptive case for the Department’s creation
would have been difficult for Congress to accept. If one examines the theoretical
literature on organizations and bureaucracy,236 the best case we could envision out for the
value of centralization is one that involves either the value of distinctive expertise at the
top of the agency or of concentrating accountability in one official to permit trade-offs
across (rather than within) bureaus. But neither of these fit with the Department’s reality.
It is difficult to accept that Ridge or Chertoff were simultaneously experts in customs
interdiction, disaster response, and technical cyber-security; the resource-transfer goals
could have been accomplished with congressional and presidential support of a White
House-based Office of Homeland Security entailing fewer transition costs (which is, not
coincidentally, what the President first chose to support).
Which brings us to the difficult question of whether the security-related gains
from the transfer of resources is enough to offset the transition costs. Such a prospect is
unlikely. For one, homeland security threats may be plausibly viewed as the
encompassing natural disaster response functions, a position that the leadership of DHS
has belatedly taken after Katrina and accords with President William McKinley’s 19th
observation that “I am more afraid of the West Indian Hurricane than I am of the entire
Spanish Navy.”237 Yet natural disaster response appears to have suffered not only from
the transition costs associated with the merger but from the Administration’s focus on
statutory and administrative changes redirecting attention towards terrorism-related
homeland security threats.238 For another, it does not appear that the most security
problems experts often cite as most pressing – involving efforts to secure weapons of
mass destruction, strengthening public health and critical infrastructure, and enhancing
response and recovery – have been meaningfully addressed by shifting resources within
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bureaus.239 Finally, even if internal shifts in bureau resources (as opposed to additional
resources) were essential to addressing the preceding problems, those benefits could have
been partially or almost entirely captured without the creation of the DHS.240 Without the
creation of DHS and its administrative oversight apparatus, however, the President would
have been forced to be much more explicit about the bureau-level changes wrought by
the HSA legislation.
To explain these developments, our account shows how three crucial variables
affecting homeland security policy – whether to create a new department at all, its overall
size and scope, and its congressional oversight structure – have been driven in specific
directions by political rather than prescriptive considerations. Rare circumstances may
help bring about occasional exceptions. In some policy domains, such those involving
benefit payments to retirees, results may be so easy to observe that electoral constraints
may force politicians to care about whether an agency is well-organized to meet its stated
goals. In others, an agency may find itself with a unique degree of autonomy – allowing
it to leverage the mass public’s reactions during a crisis – and there may happen to be
some alignment between the agenda of the agency’s leaders and what’s prescriptively
attractive. They also raise some questions about some of the canonical justifications –
grounded in expertise and accountability through presidential control – for judicial
deference to agency legal interpretations. Although these questions do not augur for
rejection of those justifications altogether, they ought to prompt scholars and
policymakers to reexamine the prescriptive merits of vesting discretion in agencies that
are not effectively designed to carry out their alleged functions.
The incapacity of federal officials to effectively address broadly-held concerns
about security in the midst of a crisis is ironic. Principle and intuition suggest that
prescriptive concerns should be strongest in the midst of a crisis. Our analysis shows that
it is otherwise in practice. In order for prescriptive concerns to prove significant,
politicians must encounter precisely the sort of counterweight that so rarely emerges in
the political game over bureaucratic structure: bureaucratic actors that have forged a rare
degree of autonomy and seek to use it in prescriptively-attractive ways, or an electorate
displaying an uncommon degree of sophistication leading it to resist naïve arguments
about the benefits of reorganization. Such circumstances are, at best, strikingly unusual.
They are even less common in the midst of a crisis. But without them, a crisis
bureaucracy is bound to be a bureaucracy in crisis.
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